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2 August 1982

USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

ARM GEN GRIBKOV DESCRIBES AIMS OF WARSAW PACT JOINT FORCES

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 82 p 5

[Article by Arm Gen A. Gribkov, Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces: "A Dependable Bulwark for Peace and Security of Peoples"]

[Text] The 27th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, the defensive military-political alliance of the nations of the socialist commonwealth, is being celebrated. The creation of the Warsaw Pact was a measure responding to the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. In 1949, the largest military-political grouping in the history of imperialism, the North Atlantic Bloc, was organized and it was aimed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. Later on, new military blocs and alliances of the imperialist states appeared.

The Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist commonwealth were forced to take measures to ensure their security. On 14 May 1955, a multilateral treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid was signed in Warsaw. This military-political alliance of fraternal countries which has gone down in history under the name of the Warsaw Pact embodied Lenin's ideas of a collective defense of socialism. It dependably serves the interests of peace and socialism.

The strength, inviolability and advantages of the Warsaw Pact are determined by the fact that it has sound sociopolitical, economic, ideological and military-strategic foundations and these are united by the common goals and interests of collectively defending the victories of socialism.

The objective bases for the military-political alliance of countries in the socialist commonwealth are reinforced and strengthened by the practical activities of the communist and workers parties which play the leading role in developing and strengthening the socialist social system. Precisely they determine the forms of military-political cooperation, together they work out measures in the area of collective defense, they ensure the high combat readiness of the armed forces in their nations and mobilize the people and the personnel of the armies to strengthen the defense might of the entire socialist commonwealth.

The joint military might of the socialist states, the core of which is the defense strength of the Soviet Union, is a dependable guarantee for their defense. It is hard to imagine what fate would befall mankind if the path of imperialism was not blocked by the Warsaw Pact.

As long as the NATO bloc survives, as long as the militaristic circles conduct an arms race, the USSR, together with the other Warsaw Pact members, will strengthen their military-political alliance. "The previous period has convincingly shown what an influential and beneficial role is played in European and generally in international affairs by the activities of the Warsaw Pact and primarily its Political Consultative Committee," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress.

During its entire 27-year existence, our defensive military-political alliance has unfailingly been the initiator in the cause of lessening international tension and strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world. A majority of the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee have been devoted to protecting the socialist commonwealth against the imperialist danger and to working out and concretizing a program for strengthening peace in Europe.

The nations of the socialist commonwealth, in conducting a coordinated foreign policy course aimed at a lessening of international tension and halting the arms race, at the same time consider the increased aggressiveness of imperialism.

The United States has set out on a policy of reaching military-strategic supremacy over the USSR and carrying out a large-scale, total arms race. Ever-new and more refined types of military equipment and weapons of mass destruction are being developed. Mankind is threatened with the neutron bomb and cruel types of chemical and other weapons. Plans are being hatched to deploy new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe with the potential of a first nuclear strike.

All of this creates a U.S. threat to our nation and its allies and can disrupt the military-strategic balance in Europe, it can undermine the possibility of any weapons control and at worst could lead to a nuclear war. Consequently, the objective truth is that collective defense is the guarantee for preventing imperialist aggression and for defense against it.

In realistically considering the complexity of the international situation, the Warsaw Pact states have been forced to show constant concern for increasing their defense capability. The mechanism of military cooperation is being improved and this encompasses virtually all aspects of the life and activities of the allied armies. The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee, the Joint Command, the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces and other bodies are functioning actively. These elaborate coordinated proposals and recommendations aimed at further strengthening the defense of the allied countries.

In relying on the military-economic and scientific-potential of their nations as well as on the growing interaction within the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration, the communist and workers parties and the governments are taking the necessary measures so that the formations and units which have been assigned to the Joint Armed Forces have a modern organization, modern weapons and equipment.

The primary basis of their military might is made up of the military personnel devoted to the ideals of communism and to the socialist military alliance. The men of our armies are indoctrinated in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology and proletarian internationalism and in the heroic traditions of the communist and workers

parties and the revolutionary and military glory of their people. Constant concern is shown so that the experience of training skilled military personnel in the USSR and the achievements of Soviet science become available to all the friendly armies of the socialist states.

There is a constant exchange in the experience of military organizational development, military and political training on the basis of full confidence deriving from the international, class fraternity of the peoples and armies of the socialist nations and the class commonness of the national military doctrines. This is aided by the conferences and assemblies for the leadership of the Joint Armed Forces, reciprocal consultations and joint military scientific conferences.

The cooperation among the political workers of the allied armies contributes to the mutual enriching in the experience of party-political and ideological work in the troops and serves to deepen the patriotic and international indoctrination of the men in the fraternal armies.

In the Joint Armed Forces constant attention is paid to continuously increasing the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces. This work is carried out in accord with the decisions adopted at the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on the questions of military organizational development.

The main efforts in the troops and fleets are aimed at further improving the field, air and sea skills of the personnel, at mastering the art of conducting modern combat and at developing the ability to make full use of the combat capabilities of the weapons and military equipment, to be victorious over a strong and technically well equipped enemy and to act confidently during the day and at night under difficult climatic and weather conditions and on any terrain.

All these difficult tasks are carried out by a further intensification of combat training and by increasing the quality and effectiveness of the tactical, special tactical and command-staff exercises.

The joint exercises conducted according to the plans of the Joint Command are a demonstration of the constant readiness of the socialist commonwealth's armies for the armed defense of the factories of socialism and of the readiness of the men to carry out their patriotic and international duty.

The joint exercises make it possible to test in practice many theoretical provisions and views on the principles and nature of conducting combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare. In the exercise fields, modern military equipment in use by the fraternal armies is tested in action. In the course of the exercises, teamwork and cooperation are developed between the national armies comprising the Joint Armed Forces.

The exercises and maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces are of great foreign policy significance as they demonstrate to the entire world the monolithicness and solidarity of the socialist armies and their constant readiness to unanimously act in defense of the victories of socialism against imperialist aggression.

In particular, the joint exercises conducted in recent years such as "Bratstvo po oruzhiyu" [Fraternity in Arms], "Shchit" [Shield] and "Soyuz" [Alliance] as well as

joint exercises for the services of the Joint Armed Forces, the operational-tactical, tactical and special tactical exercises have been a good school for field, air and sea skills of the troops and fleets.

Recently, on Hungarian and Polish territory, joint command-staff exercises were conducted. The units and subunits participating in them demonstrated high skills, teamwork, mutual understanding and the ability to act correctly and orient themselves clearly in a difficult tactical situation. The commanders and staffs demonstrated good preparation in controlling the subunits. Dependable cooperation was organized in the course of the exercises.

The joint exercises of the fraternal armies and navies serve as a powerful incentive to increase the military skill of the men of the Joint Armed Forces and unfailingly become a vivid demonstration of the constantly strengthening combat association of the allied armies, of international solidarity, military friendship and comradeship.

The Warsaw Pact armies in terms of the moral-political and combat qualities of the personnel, in terms of organizational structure, technical equipping, availability of materiel, professional training of the officer corps and the field, air and sea skills of the formations, units and ships fully meet all the basic modern requirements and are capable of guaranteeing the peaceful creative labor of the builders of socialism and communism.

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CSO: 1801/246

ARMED FORCES

PROBLEMS ATTENDANT ON INDUCTION DAY DISCUSSED

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 8 May 82 p 1

[Article by V. N. Romanov, Pervomayskiy Rayon Military Commissar in the City of Frunze: "The Fellows Leave for the Army"]

[Text] Each spring and autumn our Armed Forces replenish their ranks.

And during these months of May and June, we send off our sons who are 18-19 years of age to replace the older sons, that is, the soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers who have served their time. This is an important event for the young men, for their families, enterprises and schools and for all the nation. The motherland is calling up to the colors those who we still view at times as children needing the constant support of adults. They are to become the defenders of their fatherland and the defenders of peace on earth. And at present, there is no more important task for our party, the Soviet people and for all peoples than to defend peace.

Our army has great respect and affection. The inductees have always been sent off and are being sent off to service by the entire community, with honor, both in the villages and in the cities.

On Induction Day which was recently held (it has become traditional for us) assembling in front of the rayon military commissariat were not only the close-cropped and straight fellows who very soon, maybe even tomorrow, would be living according to the precise and exacting laws of the army. Here also came veterans from the Great Patriotic War, the heroes and celebrants of Victory Holiday which tomorrow will be marked by the Soviet people, the reserve and retired officers, the party and Komsomol workers, production pacesetters, the mentors of the youth, parents, friends and fiancés of the inductees. With emotion, the older persons spoke to the young about their most cherished desire to see spiritual comrades and successors in their sons and grandsons, to pass on all that was won and built to their dependable hands and they gave the admonishments to steadily master knowledge and defend the honor of their fatherland and their own honor. Flowers and gifts were presented to the future soldiers.

I look with respect and confidence on the young men inducted into the army.

Of course, in many ways they are not similar to my fellow comrades when we were 18. Our childhood occurred in the war with the hardship and grief from the front. The

most ardent affection and recognition were given to the people in uniforms. For us, the young boys, they were the best, strongest, kindest and most honest people. I had no other dream than to serve in the army.

At present, much is said about the difficulties of indoctrinating children under the conditions of the unprecedented material prosperity. Some parents spoil their children and protect them from work. In this still small group there are fellows who find discipline hard, who are not accustomed to obeying an order and whenever possible avoid work.

But I know one main thing about these fellows. They are truly our sons, not only in age but also in spirit. Each fellow liable for military services knows that in the Soviet Army and Navy there are subunits where it is particularly difficult to serve. Here there must be excellent health and physical conditioning, true intrepidity and courage, great knowledge, constant vigilance and a readiness to repel an enemy strike if this is needed. The fellows want to sign up precisely here in these most difficult subunits of the navy, with the paratroopers and border troops.

Even here, at the military commissariat, in formation and at DOSAAF exercises, the fellows behave more strictly and more adultly than among their associates at home or even on the job. In several months or a year, many families, schools and enterprises which are now sending off their sons, students and young workers to serve, will receive letters of thanks from the unit command for the good upbringing and preparation of the youth for military service. The young fellows from our rayon who serve in the troops within the nation and abroad are loyal to their motherland and show courage and braveness. Five of the recently demobilized young men returned with combat orders and medals for successfully carrying out a government assignment to their home city and to their parents whom they particularly loved and esteemed during separation. Now Pvt Aleksandr Bondarev and Sgts Aleksandr Gaydobrus, Vladimir Sizov, Mikhail Morozov and Aleksandr Iordan are working successfully at the city's enterprises. About them, about others like them and about the young men for whom notification from the military commissariat is a sort of admission ticket to adult life, L. I. Brezhnev said from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress: "They have not undergone the severe testings which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But, they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and people. And each time when the interests of national security and the defense of peace require it, when the victims of aggression need aid, the Soviet soldier presents himself to the world as a selfless and courageous patriot, an internationalist ready to overcome any difficulties."

A person imbibes patriotism and a love for the fatherland and homeland from childhood. This comes from the smiles of a mother, from the rustling of the wind and the fancifulness of the changing cloud pictures. But in order to become not only loyal but also a good and able soldier for one's motherland it is essential to study. The veterans of the Great Patriotic War actively pass on their experience and knowledge to the young men. In all the secondary schools (and virtually all inductees have a secondary education), basic military training is conducted by reserve or retired officers. For example, this is studied with great enthusiasm by the senior graders in the Sixth Secondary School under the leadership of Col (Res) Vladimir Stepanovich Semekhin, in the Ninth Secondary School where the military instructor is Georgiy Ivanovich Vas'kov, and in other schools. Hundreds of young men gain professions

needed for the army (as well as for peacetime life) in the DOSAAF circles and schools.

For many years at the M. V. Frunze Museum, there has been a future soldier's university where the young men gain initial skills in military service and become familiar with army life. At the I. V. Panfilov Museum, a future officer's club has been created where experienced retired officers prepare young men for admission to military schools.

Service in the Soviet Army is an excellent school of life for a young man. It teaches courage, steadfastness, purposefulness and self-discipline. These lessons are all the more beneficial the more prepared the fellows are spiritually to receive them. And they are necessary, these lessons, also for peacetime life.

We must also mention certain disconcerting traditions which have arisen on the occasion of the send-offs of the fellows for service. Namely, certain parents, in sending off their sons to the army, organize parties and provide drink for the son and his under-age friends. At the moment of saying farewell, the "concerned" friends try to slip a bottle of vodka into the pocket of the departing fellow (instead of good wishes!). As a result, the young men, having lost control of themselves and at times having lost their human appearance, commit various infractions of the law. But even if the inductee who arrives somewhat happy in the military commissariat has not done anything wrong, he is punished strictly and decisively as the army does not tolerate laxness.

The military commissariat and its activists, the soldiers and veteran officers are creating new traditions for send-offs to the army. And this is being carried out successfully. But it is important and essential that the party and Komsomol organizations of the plants and enterprises, as happens, for example, at the Tyazhelektromash [Heavy Electrical Machinery] and computer plants, organize good send-offs for the young soldiers, that orchestras play in honor of the young men and warm words be said to them. And it is also essential that in leaving the fellows know that they are being waited for. It is very important that each family sends off its son into the army with respect, with affection for him and with concern for his future and good name and this is incompatible with drinking sessions.

...It is believed that the fellows leaving today for service imbibe the great traditions of the Soviet Army and add to its glory. Let all of us be proud of the land and family which has produced the present Soviet soldier.

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CSO: 1801/249

ARMED FORCES

LOCAL ARMY PAPER MUST BE MORE EFFECTIVE

PM190951 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jul 82 p 2

[Unattributed Report under the rubric "At the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate": "For High Ideological Content and Effectiveness"]

[Excerpts] The question of the work of the red banner Carpathian military district newspaper SLAVA RODINY in fulfilling the 26th CPSU Congress demands on enhancing the ideological and publicistic standards and effectiveness of the newspaper's articles has been examined at the Soviet army and navy main political directorate. A report on this question was delivered by Col D. Vlasov, the newspaper's responsible editor.

It was pointed out during the discussion of the report that the editorial collective is doing considerable work, on the whole, to enhance the ideological standard of articles and to increase their impact on all aspects of life among the troops. [passage omitted]

At the same time it was pointed out that the content of the newspaper's articles still does not fully meet the demands stemming from the 26th Party Congress guidelines and the CPSU Central Committee resolutions on ideological questions.

Recently the newspaper has not shown consistently enough the historic advantages and achievements of real socialism. It rarely publishes articles critical of bourgeois ideology or of reactionary concepts of the nationalities question or on an atheist topic.

It was emphasized that the newspaper still fails to systematically generalize and disseminate progressive experience of party political work and to show the strengthening of party influence on enhancing combat readiness, strengthening discipline and uniting military collectives. It does not show proper concern for the information content of propaganda materials published to assist leaders and students of groups of Marxist-Leninist officer training, political studies for ensigns and political lessons. The organization of mass agitation work does not receive an in-depth analysis in the newspaper's pages. The formulation of questions of socialist competition, komsomol life and military education requires a more thoughtful approach.

The Soviet army and navy main political directorate made it incumbent on the red banner Carpathian military district political directorate and the editorial board of the newspaper SLAVA ORDINY, guided by the 26th CPSU Congress guidelines and by the demands set forth in the Party Central Committee resolution "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Education Work," to implement additional measures aimed at enhancing the ideological and publicistic standards of the newspaper's articles and increasing their impact on all aspects of life among the troops. It is necessary to continue the profound elucidation of V. I. Lenin's ideological and theoretical legacy, the 26th CPSU Congress decisions, the materials of the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) Plenum and the Soviet people's successes in communist building, to show the acuteness of the modern international situation and the need to enhance the troops' combat readiness, and to expose more promptly and convincingly in the newspaper's pages the ideological diversions of imperialism and their accomplices.

Attention must be concentrated on propaganda of the propositions and conclusions in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report at the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) Plenum and the USSR food program, and it is necessary convincingly to show the triumph of the party's Leninist agrarian policy. It is necessary to increase coverage of the work of military sovkhozes and kitchen farms and questions of economizing on material valuables and of thrift.

In its pages the newspaper should propagandize in a well-reasoned and vivid manner the achievements of real socialism and its historic advantages, translate statistical data and figures into the language of graphic images and comparisons and reveal the ideological and moral makeup of heroes of the 11th Five-Year Plan and foremost people in the district. More attention must be paid to questions of the economic education of officers, ensigns, all personnel, workers and employees.

It is the district newspaper's important task to achieve greater consistency in the coverage of questions of field and air training, the performance of combat duty and the rational use of training time and the material base, and resolutely to oppose indulgence and oversimplification in combat training and formalism in organizing socialist competition.

The newspaper's attention was drawn to the need more actively to resolve problems of strengthening discipline and questions such as the cohesion of military collectives, the use of disciplinary practice in the interests of education and the struggle against nonregulation relationships. It is necessary to propagandize in greater depth the requirements of the USSR Constitution and of the military oath and regulations and the principles of the moral code of the builder of communism, to write more frequently on questions of moral education and military ethics and to use the strength of the printed word to develop in servicemen loyalty to the sacred duty of the motherland's defender and to combat and revolutionary traditions, a feeling of love for commanders and troop comradeship.

The newspaper's editorial board is called upon to give more thoughtful coverage to questions of realizing the recommendations of the Sixth All-Army

Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries and to devote more attention to primary party organizations, to enhancing their initiative and activeness and principledness in their activities and to strengthening the role of party organizations as the political nucleus of military collectives.

The newspaper's attention was drawn to the need to give deeper thought to questions of restructuring spheres and sectors of ideological work, turning every party organization into a real center of ideological educational activity, improving the quality of articles on the practice of ideological work and showing its organization under field conditions and on flights, exercises and combat duty.

The district newspaper was instructed to improve its coverage of komsomol life and to propagandize more graphically the propositions and conclusions contained in the CPSU Central Committee greetings message to the 19th Komsomol Congress in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the congress and in the congress decisions, mobilizing young servicemen for a fitting greeting for the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation and for the successful fulfillment of socialist pledges.

The Soviet army and navy main political directorate demanded that the district political directorate make fuller use of the potential of the press in realizing the 26th CPSU Congress guidelines on enhancing the role of criticism and self-criticism in the struggle against shortcomings, give comprehensive support to the newspaper's principled articles and call strictly to account those who fail to react to critical articles or who try to get away with making formal reports. It stressed the importance of making extensive use of editorial office mail to raise urgent questions of life among the troops. It is necessary to ensure constant coverage of the practice of work with letters in units and subunits, to send reviews of letters to the appropriate staffs, political organs and directorates, strengthen the editorial office's link with military correspondents, regularly hold readers' conferences and military correspondents' meetings and take more fully into account the needs of the newspaper's main readership--soldiers, sergeants, ensigns and young officers.

The political directorates of the branches of the armed forces, districts, groups of forces and fleets are recommended to analyze comprehensively the state of party leadership of the press and to ensure that editorial collectives strictly fulfill the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and other party documents on enhancing the ideological and publicistic standard and effectiveness of newspaper articles.

CSO: 1801/298

ARMED FORCES

SHESTOPALOV ON MILITARY HOUSING

[Editorial Report] PM091535 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 82 carries on page 2 a 2,100-word article entitled "Property of All the People" by Marshal of engineering troops N. Shestopalov, USSR deputy defense minister for construction and the billeting of troops. Shestopalov passes from a description of progress in general housing construction to achievements in improving military and naval accommodation including, in certain named areas, the elimination of "poorly equipped barrack-type accommodation." Shestopalov notes "underfulfillment" in construction plans in some areas and cites "uneconomical" use of funds and resources as a cause.

CSO: 1801/298

ARMED FORCES

FOLLOW-UP REPORTS ON LETTERS TO EDITORS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 82 p 2

[Unattributed follow-ups on letters to editors]

[Text] "Sham Recommendations"

This was the name of the letter from officers V. Labayev, I. Sal'nikov and M. Tal'yantsev with commentary by our correspondent Lt Col V. Shchekotov, published on 24 February. It was a question of shortcomings in the training of sergeants in the artillery training regiment X of the Urals Military District. In particular, the lack of objectivity in the service recommendations for certain students was commented on.

The commander of the missile troops and artillery in the Urals Military District, Maj Gen Art L. Kotsar', has informed the editors that the article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was discussed at a meeting of officers from the training units. Measures were adopted to eliminate the shortcomings designated by the newspaper. The certification of the students has been put under strict control and now all service recommendations for them are varified by the unit commander and his deputy for political affairs. Training literature has been received and additionally purchased. The battery commander, Sr Lt N. Musiyenko, was strictly reminded of the need for objective grades of the individual students.

"Prejudice"

This was the name of the correspondence from Lt Col (Ret) I. Moshkovskiy published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 14 February. It raised the issue of the unhealthy situation in the collective of the training center the leaders of which in essence have organized the persecution of those who criticized them for abuses and shortcomings in work.

As the editors have been informed by the first deputy chief of the political directorate of military construction units, Col M. Simakov, the newspaper's article was reviewed at a meeting of political body leaders and party committee secretaries of the construction and billeting bodies of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The leaders of the political section who reviewed the complaints from the instructor of the training center, the communist M. Yermachenko, on his persecution for criticism, pointed to the need for a more principled attitude toward such alerts.

The decision was adopted to remove and discharge into the reserves the chief of the training center, Engr-Lt Col I. Kryukov.

ARMED FORCES

REPLIES TO LETTER OF OFFICERS' ROLE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 82 p 2

[Unattributed review of replies to the letter "This Cannot Be Tolerated": "The Force of a Personal Example"]

[Text] Some 1,134 readers responded to the letter by Guards Capt S. Kapitonov "This Cannot Be Tolerated" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 23 January. Among them were commanders, political workers, staff officers, military engineers, secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations, reserve and retired officers as well as frontline veterans....

The letters, like the persons who wrote them, varied. Behind each letter was a particular life, a particular experience and view of the problem. But there was something common found in virtually every letter. The readers were unanimous in the opinion that a prompt and necessary discussion was raised on the newspaper's pages about the ways to increase the role of officers on the regimental and ship level in strengthening military discipline and proper order. Many authors emphasized that the surest way to this was to ensure the personal example set by the officers in training, service, discipline and the competition.

In whom do the Soviet soldiers see as an example for themselves? From whom would they want to learn industriousness, principledness, organization and efficiency? Primarily from the commanders and superiors who are able organizers for the instruction and indoctrination of subordinates and who set the example of sociopolitical activeness. From the political workers, the secretaries and members of the party committees and bureaus whose vanguard role and whose example largely determine the moral atmosphere of the military collectives.

Wherein lies the force of the influence had by the commanders, political workers and party activists on the men? What attracts the men to them? Above all, the high ideological conviction, the wholehearted dedication to the motherland and loyalty to military duty. Soviet officers are worthy representatives of Lenin's party and active proponents of its policy in life. They dedicate all their force, knowledge and experience to strengthening combat readiness and to mobilizing the personnel to successfully carry out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the USSR. Communist ideological loyalty and conviction, as was emphasized at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, this is the core of the military character which has helped and

does help all generations of our military to find in themselves the strength to overcome any difficulties of military service and to unfailingly carry out the set tasks.

Many of our serviceman readers have written to the editors on the high moral-political and professional qualities and on the finest traits in the work style of the commanders, political workers and party organization secretaries. In reading these letters, one would see a generalized portrait of the Soviet military leader, the officer communist who is an example of organization, discipline and moral purity.

Here is a letter sent in by a young political worker, Sr Lt R. Yusupov. He describes Maj V. Dubrovin. The subunit commanded by Dubrovin achieved high results in combat training, in the competition and in strengthening discipline.

"Here, at first glance, there are no special 'secrets'," writes Sr Lt Yusupov. "Everything is the same as in the other subunits. But there still is a 'secret.' It is that the authority of the commanders and political workers of the subunit is exceptionally high. And everything comes from the communist Dubrovin, an officer totally involved in service, with an acute sense of responsibility who is able to combine high proper exactingness with painstaking indoctrination of the men and a paternal concern for them."

Here is what Sr Lt A. Grushko writes:

"I feel lucky because I started service as a subordinate of officer Yu. Melekhin who was competent in all regards, who had a delicate feeling for all that was new and advanced and who was capable of promptly spotting and supporting initiative. We not merely respected him. We were proud of our commander. It was an honor if someone said of our work that it was almost like Melekhin's. The whole question was that he himself constantly studied and grew and kept pace with the achievements of military science."

Warm, heartfelt words about the commanders and superiors are to be found in the letter of Capt-Lt S. Konovalov:

"We learn from them not only because they are senior in rank and position," he pointed out. "The commanders and superiors, by their labor, by their attitude toward the job and by their concrete concern for the men, win strong authority. I am convinced of this from the experience of ship service. For example, I always look with amazement at the political worker, Capt 2d Rank V. Yablonskiy. An experienced educator and sensitive psychologist, he knows how and loves to work with the men. Even if he makes a comment or rebukes it is not insulting because one knows that this is done for a reason. He passes on his experience and knowledge in such a manner that most often the impression is gained that you yourself have achieved this. You gain confidence in your own forces and want to work even better."

It is probably no accident that the editor's mail contained several letters mentioning the political worker, Capt 2d Rank Yablonskiy. Other officers wrote about him warmly, with gratitude for the help and for his knowledge.

Service and daily life for a young officer occurs in a collective, among comrades. And their role in his development is important. They are always ready to support a lieutenant, to help, and if need be, also be demanding in a comradely manner and without any concessions. Such attention from fellow servicemen to his ideological and professional growth cannot help but leave a good taste.

For example, after completing military school, service started roughly for the young officer, V. Yezhov. There was a period when it was completely off the track. The reason was Yezhov's inattentiveness which subsequently developed into disciplinary infractions. Yezhov, as they say, was roundly condemned and immediately lost interest in service. In his letter, Capt V. Yezhov admitted that he himself did not know how Officer A. Barkovskiy succeeded in finding the key to him. But he did. After meetings and talks with the senior comrade, he began to think more and more about his future. He began to look at his comrades, the same young officers as himself. How enthusiastically they served! And how they were respected in the unit! Was he any worse?...

Now Capt Yezhov is in command of a subunit. And it is held in good repute.

"What would have happened to me if there had been no Officer Barkovskiy?" Capt Yezhov wonders. "Of course, as long as I live I will remember his concern. Yet, I feel that if it had not been him someone else would have helped me. In our unit we have many good indoctrinator commanders. We have something to learn from them."

The readers Yu. Rybakov, V. Bobrovskiy, N. Krapivin, N. Sergeyev, A. Yatsenko, S. Skobelev, A. Baklan, G. Polyakov, V. Pushkarev and O. Dolgushin have written to the editors about remarkable commanders and masters of instruction and indoctrination. Comrades F. Oleynik, V. Kondrat'yev, N. Sirenko, V. Yeremeyev, S. Titarenko, V. Sedov, V. Kucherenko, I. Gaysin, G. Zimin, V. Tret'yak, Khvorost'yanov, Savel'yev and many others have sent warm words of gratitude to their commanders and chiefs.

The authors of many letters told about officers in military schools and academies and experienced indoctrinators.

"Recalling the years of study in the academy, initially as a student and then as a graduate student," writes Engr-Maj V. Resevskiy, "I would like to say a good word about Engr-Col L. Yakovenko. We saw him as an exacting and just commander. Now we endeavor to be like him. There is no other way as our duty to the teacher obliges us...."

A very correct idea: Duty to those who have taught us, who have constantly handed on their knowledge and experience and helped us in word and deed--this duty obliges us to show the same attention to our subordinates.

The years pass and much is forgotten but the former officer candidates recall with gratitude their first commanders and instructors.

"In difficult moments of life," said Sr Lt S. Kovalev in his letter, "I always turn for advice and aid in my mind to the instructor of the military school, Officer N. Vorob'yev. He helped me when I was an officer candidate and he helps me now. I would like to say words of gratitude to him for helping me become a military

specialist and to love the lively, interesting but not always easy work with the men."

Here is a letter of a different nature and content. Lt A. Savelov writes that in his unit he cannot find any example to imitate. What is interesting is that the editor's mail contained several letters from the same unit.

"For me, Capt S. Kovyrin is an example of discipline, exactingness for himself and subordinates and moral purity," writes Lt V. Vlasenko. "And I bow to Sr Lt N. Makarov. He always follows our high military, party and moral standards," is how Sr Lt A. Mizentsev responded about his fellow serviceman.

It turns out that Lt Savelov does have someone to learn from! Obviously, he must look closer at the experience and work style of the best officers in the unit.

The letters from the frontline veterans and the reserve and retired officers are uniquely stirring. They contain reflections reinforced by combat practice and all experience in life about the profound moral sense and inspiring strength of an officer's personal example. The authors of the letters (the CPSU member since 1918 Maj Gen (Ret) V. Gridnev, Hero of the Soviet Union A. Raftopullo, Comrades I. Golenkov, P. Bayushchenko, V. Oleynik, A. Shtan', K. Nikul'shin, Yu. Ryss, I. Koshel', P. Nikodimov and Yu. Bobkov) emphasize that close contact between a superior and subordinates is a dependable guarantee for success in any matter. The readers M. Rytsarev, Ye. Avdeyev, N. Stroyev, V. Potapov, P. Makoveyev, N. Sheremet, V. Yakovlev, S. Fomin, V. Shchetinin, Ye. Nefedov, S. Potapov, G. Slesarev, N. Grishenkov and many others tell about commanders and political workers who are able to reach the hearts of every man.

In appealing to the present generation of Soviet officers who are in service, the veterans advise them to look more often at themselves through the eyes of the war veterans and senior comrades and to learn from them courage, loyalty to military duty and discipline. As was pointed out at the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, in indoctrinational aims it is essential to make more active use of the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, the heroic feats of the USSR Armed Forces, the examples of mass heroism by the Soviet military in the Great Patriotic War and the examples of the unstinting fulfillment of military duty in the postwar times.

In conclusion, let us point out that a portion of the letters, the authors of which share their observations and make specific proposals, has already been published in the newspaper. Many reader replies on the importance of an officer's authority in strengthening discipline have lain at the basis of the article by Arm Gen P. Beloborodov "There is No Higher Honor" published on 13 April. Letters of a critical nature or the requiring of the taking of measures have been forwarded by the editors to the appropriate staffs and political bodies. The reader proposals, as Guards Capt Kapitonov informed the editors, have helped the officers of the battalion which he commands in eliminating the shortcomings in work.

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ARMED FORCES

REPLIES TO CRITICISM OF MILITARY NEWSPAPERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 82 p 2

[Unattributed follow-up on the article "An Important Task of the Military Press"; the original article was published in JPRS 80598, 19 Apr 82. USSR Report: "Military Affairs"]

[Text] On 24 March the newspaper published a review of the press published under the title "An Important Task of the Military Press." It pointed to individual shortcomings in the work of the editorial collective of the newspaper in the Baltic Military District ZA RODINU. In particular, it was pointed out that in the articles on indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of constantly observing Soviet laws and the requirements of the military oath and regulations, at times there was not a profound investigation of the social and moral aspects of discipline or the disclosure of the true reasons for shortcomings.

The editor of the newspaper ZA RODINU, V. Belyakov, has informed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the review of the press was discussed at the editorial board and party bureau. The attention of the section employees was drawn to the fact that the materials should deal more profoundly with such questions as: individual work with the men and the introduction of a comprehensive approach in indoctrinating the personnel. Measures have been taken to strengthen the propaganda in the paper about the USSR Constitution, the requirements of the military oath and regulations and the bases of military pedagogics and psychology. A number of materials have already been published on these questions. In the aim of raising the effectiveness of the newspaper articles, materials are to be published regularly under the headings "The Echo of Our Actions" and "The Newspaper Has Acted. What Has Been Done?"

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GROUND FORCES

'REALISM' IN COMBAT TRAINING URGED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Colonel G. Trofimov, staff officer, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "But They Didn't Know Their 'Enemy'..."]

[Text] The following incident occurred during one particular exercise. Following an operation, a representative of a higher-level staff inquired of company commander Senior Lieutenant V. Platonov concerning the nature of the "enemy" he had had to oppose during his attack on the strong point and asked him to sketch out a diagram of his weapon dispositions. The young officer found himself in difficulty.

"We didn't get into that during the engagement," he declared to justify himself.

It was strange to hear something like this from a commander who still had not cooled off after his attack. How in the world did he conduct his operations during the engagement? The approach this company commander had taken to the problem of organizing his operations was a consequence of oversimplifications indulged by the exercise director. During the course of the exercise, many officers came to have questions such as, for example: why deploy all battalion subunits (podrazdeleniye) if facing them there are only small "enemy" forces, which a single company would be enough to destroy; how are we supposed to respond to artillery fire if we haven't even seen any simulated fire?... But the battalion commander required something, so his officers responded. Over the course of the entire exercise they were fighting an abstract, if it could be put that way, "enemy" and acting without taking his tactics into account.

I recalled this incident during a tactical exercise with field fire one of the units (chast') was conducting. It looked as though the exercise director had taken everything into account in the way of organizing simulation. But when the discussion got around to the "enemy's" principles of operation, the regimental chief of staff, who had prepared the plan for the exercise, could not find anything really intelligible to say. He later admitted that the "enemy" operational tactics employed in the exercise had been highly arbitrary.

We can see a direct connection between these two incidents: the situation created on an exercise will determine the attitude a commander takes to the opposing side. Is it really necessary to point out how important it is to keep this in mind in the process of developing an exercise plan? Everything has to be well-thought-out here, everything taken into consideration. Personnel will otherwise not get an adequate or a correct idea of the nature of modern-day warfare.

On one particular exercise, a large round target was raised on poles some 200 meters from the flank of two columns advancing in parallel. The commanders of the companies involved in the march reacted differently to this situation. One ordered his men to don protective gear and increase the speed of their advance. The other deployed his company for combat and then, after pausing to consider the situation, ordered his antiaircraft gunners to repel an "enemy" air attack. But as to the nature of the target, neither the one commander nor the other could say anything definite.

In the meantime, as it turned out, the exercise director was using this target to simulate an attack by combat helicopters. He was doing this, however, without taking into account the nature of the terrain or the tactics associated with helicopter operations. The target was raised over level terrain. Everybody knows that under these conditions a helicopter could be seen several kilometers away. The target should have been raised at that distance.

The following incident as well demonstrates how this kind of approach to the problem of designating the "enemy" affects the actions of subunits during an exercise. I had occasion to observe the performance of an artillery battalion during one of the phases of an engagement. The crews were running back and forth around their guns, and you could hear the crisp commands ring out.

"What mission is the subunit firing?" we asked the commander.

"The battalion is firing on the 'enemy'," Captain P. Grinyuk reported. On what kind of "enemy" it was firing upon, what kind of rounds the artillerymen were using--nobody had any clear idea of these things. It really isn't necessary to talk about how effective this kind of exercise is. It did not create the kind of conditions which would have helped commanders develop creativity and initiative. And as far as their men are concerned, they were therefore essentially merely simulating a combat operation.

Everybody knows that success in combat is determined to a decisive degree by an ability to locate the enemy in a timely manner, discover his intentions, exploit his weak points in one's own interest etc. And where, if not in the course of an exercise, under conditions approximating to the greatest possible extent those of actual combat, will it be possible for people to learn how to do this? Realism can be made to have its maximum impact, of course, in an exercise involving two opposing sides. But if---and it's precisely this kind of exercise we're talking about here--there is only one side involved? A great deal will depend upon how we indicate "enemy" activity in this case.

It should be pointed out in this connection that higher-echelon staff officers can play no small role in the effort to insure that the training process approximates as nearly as possible the conditions prevailing in actual combat. They recently assisted in conducting a tactical exercise with field firing in the X Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. The plan for the exercise and the procedures to be employed in simulating "enemy" activity were carefully thought through first. Special mobile simulation teams with a variety of targets available were employed to create surprise situations. They were equipped with different signaling devices and explained to the people involved the concept behind an activity at each stage of the exercise. This made it possible to create a complex, highly dynamic and instructive situation for the trainees involved, a situation requiring the exertion of great effort, resolute, decisive action and initiative on the part of both the commander of the tank battalion, Guards Major G. Bogatchik, and his all his men.

Practical experience demonstrated once again that to create complex, instructive exercise situations requires great creativity, resourcefulness and inventiveness. Taking into consideration the fact that commanders of small subunits do not dispose of any substantial capability for simulating "enemy" activity, I think training center officers and maintenance personnel could play a larger role here. What would this require? More efficient utilization of all available training center equipment and more vigorous efforts to introduce practical application of suggestions put forward by rationalizers and inventors. In preparing for tactical training or group exercises within the command training system, more attention should be given to presentation of an "enemy's" strong points.

To create for each exercise a situation approximating to the greatest possible extent one which would be encountered in actual combat means to teach commanders in combat training to think creatively, to make decisions independently and then to implement those decisions, that is, to teach them what is necessary in war.

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GROUND FORCES

PROBLEMS IN TRAINING CENTER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Aug 81 p 1

[Article by Major B. Krasnonogov, chief of staff, X unit: "An Object Lesson, Why Training Plans are Being Disrupted in Some Subunits"]

[Text] We unit staff officers were recently tallying up the results of the 1st artillery battalion's July training program performance and were struck by the thought that some areas of the combat training plan had not been covered fully. One battery's time on the firing range had been virtually eliminated.

I recall how carefully the battalion had drawn up its plan for the month, in what detail the battery schedules had been worked out. Battery commander Senior Lieutenant V. Morosin, for example, had submitted a weekly schedule which did not make entirely clear the sequence by which personnel were to increase their knowledge and skills in specialized training for the period. He had therefore to make substantial corrections in his training schedule.

The commander approved the plan prepared by the battalion staff. It remained only to carry it out completely and effectively. But the very first week began to see lack of coordination in the organization of the training process. As it turned out, the formation (soyedineniye) staff had planned a three-day program of instruction in the training center for a neighboring subunit (podrazdeleniye) which was scheduled to participate in a tactical exercise. So our battery had to be recalled from the training center. The question arises here of whether it is really possible that the formation staff was unaware of the upcoming exercise.

"That's life," Lieutenant Colonel A. Kireyev explained to me. "Of course we knew about the exercise coming up, but it had not yet been decided which subunit was going to participate in it."

This doesn't strike me as a convincing enough explanation. The fact is that the formation staff knew that for a period of three days one of the subunits was going to be using the training center. They could therefore have notified us ahead of time, and it would not have been necessary to send our battery over there and thus waste our training time.

Practical experience has shown that some officers treat planning as a highly approximative business: you'll always have a chance, they say, to fill in some details, to make corrections in the process of carrying out your plans. But they forget that the

intense pace of today's training program makes corrections required on account of miscalculations or errors excessively costly.

It not infrequently happens, for example, that the monthly plan reaches us in the unit late from the formation staff. Then following the plan we'll begin to see additions and refinements to it come in. This forces us unit staff officers to make changes in the training schedule. In July, for example, because of "corrections" like this every one of the battalion subunits lost two or three training days apiece on account of having to perform other tasks (unanticipated garrison details, administrative and construction duties etc.). The thing is, many of these "unexpected" could also have been foreseen and taken into account in the process of preparing the training schedule.

At an official conference with the senior commander I tried to find out why we have these disruptions in our planning system and who is responsible for them. Strange as it may seem, some of the senior officers began to explain to me that these breakdowns in coordination, these modifications patched in are objective in nature, in other words, that they're something we'll simply have to reconcile ourselves to....

So far we've been talking about shortcomings in planning procedures. At this point, though, we should also point out that, given the situation as it had developed, the battalion commander, Major V. Tsurikov, failed to demonstrate the persistence required in the interest of more complete fulfillment of the training plan. The neighboring battalion, for example, was able to cover almost all its training areas through the addition of more training periods, self-instruction and effective utilization of time available on maintenance day.

Neither, would it appear, did the commander and staff of the 1st battalion demonstrate any great exactingness in their attitude toward their battery commanders. The latter were as a consequence also to blame for a number of breakdowns in the training process. Anticipating, for example, that the higher-echelon staff would have planned methods training for the NCOs in a series of one-day sessions, subunit commanders did not bother themselves with organizing instructional methods training for junior commanders. And then when the need arose for additional crew training drills, the NCOs proved unprepared to play their role as drill instructors for these areas.

Our unit staff officers are not, of course, trying to avoid shouldering their share of the blame for the fact that the monthly plan was not completely fulfilled. Because of having been working in other subunits we lost sight of the state of training affairs in the 1st battalion. This has been an object lesson for us as well. Let's try in the period immediately ahead to make up for what we have neglected.

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GROUND FORCES

MARCH TRAINING STRESSED IN EDITORIAL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Aug 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Troop March Training"]

[Text] Good troop march training is one of the factors decisive in achieving success in combat. During the Great Patriotic War, rapid movement by formations (soyedineniye) and units (chast') covering tens and hundreds of kilometers would, as a rule, help achieve surprise and superiority over the enemy.

March training is acquiring even greater importance under modern-day conditions. This comes in consequence of qualitative changes in the technical equipment of military forces, the great dynamism of modern-day combat operations and progress in the development of means of armed combat. The combat soldier will be called upon now as never before to be ready for maneuver operations, to execute bold envelopments, deep flanking movements and rapid thrusts to the flanks and the rear of an enemy and to carry out decisive surprise attacks from different directions. Units and subunits (podrazdeleniye) must always be ready to march under conditions in which there will be the constant threat of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and the effects of his aviation, airborne and reconnaissance and sabotage groups and of the destruction of roads and crossings. To teach the combat soldier to perform skillfully on the march under conditions approximating to the greatest possible extent those of actual combat constitutes the most important task of our commanders and staff personnel.

The X Guards Tank Regiment (Belorussian Military District) can serve us as an example in this regard. Each movement in the field, each tactical and marching drill exercise, each training exercise here is utilized to the full with the objective of improving subunit march training. Attention in this case is devoted primarily to training personnel in driving tanks at high speeds, day and night, off the road and in battle and approach-march formations. Good march skills have more than once helped tankers achieve success in exercise situations. Advancing over unfamiliar terrain in their exercise area, regiment subunits recently demonstrated once again to achieve high march speeds and maintain good organization. Particularly distinguishing themselves were men of the battalion commanded by Guards Major A. Ganin. They showed outstanding skill and an ability to change direction suddenly, deploy and engage the enemy from the march.

And there are no few examples like this. At the same time, however, there are still instances proving that march training is sometimes still being conducted without taking

proper account of the nature of modern-day warfare or of the need for thorough, painstaking organization and full support for troop movement. Some commanders are making little effort to insure that the tactical-technical capabilities of modern military hardware is exploited to maximum effectiveness on a march and to see that during movement their personnel maintain continuous observations and are always ready to engage the enemy. Adequate attention is not always being given to training specialists to drive using night vision devices and to driving as an element of a crew or subunit and executing tactical and fire missions. As practical experience has demonstrated, some officers are unable to orient themselves properly on unfamiliar terrain and do not maintain effective control of their subunits during movement.

Insuring that commanders master the art of leading troops is a task of critical importance. To improve their skills it will be necessary to take more effective advantage of training and exercises conducted as part of the officer's training program, the fund of front-line experience and practical experience accumulated in everyday combat training. The training of officers in march organization and subunit control at night, in the mountains, in the desert, in the tundra and under other difficult geographic and climatic conditions--this is a focus of special concern on the part of commanders and staff personnel of all branches of the service. A commander must be able to do everything under any conditions to insure that the subunit entrusted to him arrive in its appointed area or reach its designated line on time and in full readiness to execute its combat mission.

Adequate march support will play an important role here. The objective in this connection is to create for the forces involved favorable conditions for movement and under which then to engage the enemy in a well-organized manner, provide them with timely warning of threats of enemy ground and air attack, maintain high levels of subunit and unit fighting efficiency and to supply them with everything they need to accomplish their march successfully. This is achieved best where deputy commanders, staff officers and branch and service chiefs are drawn into the process of accomplishing march support-related tasks.

Improvement of march training is inseparably linked with improvement in the quality of training provided personnel in combat vehicle operation. On all exercises, in all training periods, during all drills and work periods involving the use of equipment it is necessary constantly to instruct personnel in the most effective methods of operating, maintaining and repairing it under difficult conditions approximating as nearly as possible those of actual combat. Practical experience demonstrates that the success personnel achieve in mastering the use of their equipment is closely linked with the commander's ability to combine simulator exercises with practical experience in combat vehicle operation and to organize competition centering around the tasks and norms involved in technical training.

March discipline is an indispensable condition of successful troop movement and efficient control of march formations. All marches, particularly tactical marches, require of the personnel involved good organization, effective execution and undeviating adherence to established procedures. Each driver must know his place in the column, strictly maintain the speed and distance prescribed by the commander, be capable of negotiating contaminated areas and observe rules governing blackout procedures during movement at night. It is also important that personnel be taught to take their assigned places in their vehicles quickly and without unnecessary commotion. Commands and signals transmitted during movement or at the halt must be received quickly, carried out precisely and passed on to neighboring vehicles.

The success of a march is to a great extent determined by the level of party political work. Commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations must give especially careful thought to the political support for a march and insure that communists and Komsomol members set good personal examples. It is important in this connection to be able skillfully to distribute a unit's party political apparatus among its subunits with the objective of rendering assistance and mobilizing personnel to maintain good organization and strong discipline. Practical experience teaches that these efforts are most effective where party-political information is well-organized, new methods and ideas are effectively disseminated, wide publicity is given personnel turning outstanding performances, there is demonstrated concern for adequate material and technical support and, finally, where there is well-organized provision of food and relaxation for the troops.

Continuous improvement of the march training of our forces constitutes one of the most important conditions for increasing their combat readiness and for successful accomplishment of the difficult and important tasks which have been set the USSR Armed Forces.

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GROUND FORCES

SIMULATORS STANDING IDLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel M. Lishniy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Why Are Simulators Standing Idle?"]

[Text] The opening of a simulator complex in one of the training units (chast') of the Red Banner Ural Military District was timed to coincide with the beginning of the training year. Officers from the district directorate of combat training and military educational institutions then held training for subunit (podrazdeleniye) officers in which they demonstrated the use of this training equipment and gave recommendations concerning its operation and methods of organizing training.

There were no few among these officers who were highly sceptical of these innovations, particularly of the moving picture simulators. To train personnel with the use of a motion picture was not, they said, any promising thing. But the past year has convinced many of these people: the moving picture simulator is in fact a useful thing. The use of these devices offers great potential not only for substantially increasing the intensity of the training process, but for achieving economies in the use of motor vehicles, fuel and lubricants, ammunition and other material resources as well. With the introduction of motion picture simulators into its training program, the Dvinskiy Tank Training Regiment, for example, has sharply improved the quality of the training it provides its drivers, substantially reduced consumption of motor transport resources and saved a lot of fuel. Motion picture simulators have "taken on" almost half the load formerly carried by combat vehicles.

In another unit, the use of electronic simulators in gunner-operator training in firing on snap and moving targets has made it possible to cut ammunition consumption and at the same time substantially to improve the quality of gunner training.

In a word, the introduction of this training equipment has made it possible to achieve substantial progress in improving the end product of the combat training process as well as new successes in competition to achieve savings and economies. But here's a paradox: far from all military units which have simulators are using the effectively and with maximum efficiency. First-rate equipment has been "on the balance" in some military units for two or three years already; classrooms with systems of programmed instruction and electronic instruments and control consoles to monitor learning have been built, but results?--none whatsoever. Why is this?

Let's begin with the unit in which Major Yu. Ivanov has been responsible for the introduction of these simulators. The film trainer classroom, in which training was to have been going at full steam on this particular day, was found to be locked. Staff officer N. Arsenov and I had to wait at least an hour for the people here finally to find the key to the door and then get it open.

"Access to this facility is strictly limited," the officer declares in explaining the situation. "These film trainers are really complex pieces of equipment. There's still a problem with...."

On the floor and in the cockpits of the enclosed simulators was a layer of dust. The instruments and motion picture screens remained in their packing. To the question of when the last training had been held here the technician replied: "I don't remember."

You saw the same picture in the training regiment in which officer M. Kabak serves. Here, too, the simulator facility was locked. And here it turned out that training had been conducted two months ago.

More detailed familiarization with the situation involving the use of simulators in these units permits us to draw the conclusion that this training equipment exists here only for show. They use them for training only from time to time, with no plan or regularity. Some students completing their training courses leave these regiments without ever once having been in the "mysterious" film trainer facility.

The district directorate for combat training and military educational institutions explains this state of affairs by pointing to a lack of understanding on the part of some commanders and staff officers of the role and place of simulators in the effort to intensify the training process and to achieve savings and economies and to an inability to surmount the psychological barrier which has become implanted in the consciousness of some officers in connection with the use of training equipment. But I think there's more to it than this. You can clearly see the problem as well in the low degree of exactingness with which some commanders and other senior personnel, to include officers of the district directorate of combat training and military educational institutions, deal with the responsible officials involved.

This is what has been happening. The units we have referred to above undertook a radical reorganization of their material-technical training base precisely with the active participation of officers of the district directorate of combat training and military educational institutions. It was they who developed the methodology to be employed in conducting this training, they who put on the demonstrations and gave instruction in how to use this equipment. But they cannot limit their mission to this alone. They should have set up a program for monitoring the use of this equipment during the training process. And it is precisely this kind of control, this kind of exactingness which has been missing.

The neglect of simulators in the training regiment in which officer M. Kabak serves is especially striking. Two years ago I had occasion to visit this regiment's tank training area. Simulators for tank driver training were standing idel then. Many of their parts and components had been removed. People promised to replace these parts and components, adjust the things and put them into operation. I come back a year later--it turns out that no specialist has even laid a hand on them. The regiment again assures me--we'll have the simulators working again in the next few days. And now another year later and I'm back with this unit. Alas, the picture's even more depressing this time: where the simulators once stood there's only a heap of iron.

The damage done to the combat training process as a consequence of the adoption of this approach to things is difficult to measure with any kind of figures. But here are some facts. The regiment completed the past training year with a "satisfactory" rating. It was barely able to achieve this rating during this year's winter training period. And now in the concluding exercises the ratings here are low. At the same time, however, the Dvinskiy Regiment, which gives proper attention to the use of training equipment and new techniques, is maintaining its "outstanding" rating for the second year in a row.

These contrasts stem from the fact that there is no system, no planning associated with the introduction of training equipment or new methods or ideas nor the necessary attention devoted to it on the part first of all of staff personnel, who are supposed to take the lead in introducing innovations and improvements. One gets the impression that some people think the adoption of the use of simulators is a voluntary thing: if I want to I'll use them, if I don't I won't.

At the beginning of the year at a party meeting of the district's directorate of combat training and military educational institutions the question arose of improving the planning and organization of the effort to introduce training equipment and upon this basis to achieve savings and economies. The communists pointed to the need to be more exacting toward commanders and staff personnel with regard to the quality and effectiveness with which they monitor and assist their subordinates. They adopted a wide-ranging resolution providing for checks on unit performance and that some orderly procedure be adopted to govern utilization of the existing material-technical base. But many of these plans have remained on paper only. The simulators in some units are not being put to their intended use; others have components missing or are not in operating order. But the fact is that a simulator is a costly thing. So the hours it stands idle do not come cheaply either.

For the sake of fairness it should be said that the use, maintenance and repair of this training equipment do present some objective difficulties. Motion picture and electronic simulators for training and drilling specialists are complex affairs requiring high levels of technical training on the part of the people of maintain and repair them. These specialists have so far been picked and trained on an amateurish, haphazard basis in the regiments themselves. Many of them have had no training whatsoever and do not possess the required skills.

So here, clearly, is an appropriate place to admonish the staff and district directorate of combat training and military educational institutions with regard to one other thing. It is time for them to take into their own hands the responsibility for training the specialists which will be necessary to service the simulators and other training equipment the armed forces are receiving in ever increasing numbers. The problem is that units now responsible for training these specialists dispose of very limited resources.

To be an innovator in his field, to search for, introduce and speak out for the new and improved, to strive for savings and economies--these are the tasks of every officer. They flow from the decisions of the 26th Party Congress. In speaking of the conditions of successful plan fulfillment, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the congress that this requires above all a deep sense of responsibility. "But no less essential, of course," he emphasized, "is that we give wings to our thoughts, that we carry on a tireless search for the new and the innovative and that we then support this innovation. We need a continuous initiative, initiative everywhere and in everything."

The sphere in which above all we should be displaying initiative and innovative spirit under our army conditions is combat training, particularly the use of simulators in the training process. This is one of the most effective ways to intensify the training process and to achieve economies in the consumption of material resources.

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GROUND FORCES

IMPROVING MOUNTAIN TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Colonel K. Bregman, chief of department, directorate of combat training and military educational institutions, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "How to Improve Mountain Training, A Reader Asks"]

[Text] Our district devotes a great deal of attention to troop mountain training, the requirement for which increases with each passing year. It can be confidently stated that the ability of subunit (podrazdeleniye) and unit (chast') personnel to perform successfully under mountain conditions constitutes one of the factors determining the degree of their combat readiness. This is being confirmed during the concluding exercises now under way. Transcaucasus troops are demonstrating their increased mastery of combat skills here, to include those they have acquired in the course of their mountain training. There are still, however, no few unresolved problems in this connection.

As we know, one of the primary components of the overall state of a subunit's mountain training is the individual training of the troops comprising it, their ability to negotiate canyons and rapid river currents and to climb steep cliffs and glaciers. But who has been entrusted with the task of teaching our people this difficult art?

In the subunits of our district it is primarily outside, nonorganizational mountain training instructors who instruct our men in mountain operations. As a rule, these are motorized rifle platoon leaders or company commanders. We prepare them by putting them through a special program developed by the district directorate for combat training and military educational institutions. Candidates for instructor positions go through qualification courses each year in the district's mountain training center. The future instructors are then sent for training at one of the high-altitude mountaineering bases. Drills and exercises are organized for them here, and they climb what are referred to as test peaks. Officers of the directorate for combat training and military educational institutions and military school instructors are, as a rule, appointed exercise directors. These courses conclude with marches of first- and second-category difficulty. Course participants are certified as nonorganizational mountain training instructors.

It would have appeared that this process would have been refined and organized to a T over the course of many years of experience. And it is indeed true that we have been conducting this training for more than 10 years now. But unresolved problems remain.

Here is one of them. Who trains the future instructors? As has been said above, they are being trained primarily by officers of the district's directorate of combat training and military educational institutions, who conduct exercises and training as mountain training instructors. They have all gone through mountaineering skills school and have been brought up within the district. Major V. Pasichnyy, for example, is a directorate officer who began with mountaineering training at the district training center on his own time and who has participated in climbs. Captain V. Golub, Senior Lieutenant V. Vasil'yev and Warrant Officer V. Zhavoronkin have followed the same course. The training they conduct in the subunits by and large measures up to present-day requirements. But to train nonorganizational instructors the state of their own training is proving to be inadequate.

We are of course striving to rectify this situation and to improve the state of their professional training. In my view, however, it would be to greater advantage to train mountain training instructors at, say, Ground Forces level at a specially equipped training center where everything necessary would be available, to include special mountain-climbing equipment which we ourselves presently do not have enough of. Greater attention should also be devoted to tactical and fire training and military topography.

It seems to me that there is another question requiring urgent attention as well. From among whom should we train our nonorganizational mountain training instructors?

Let's say that within a few months of having completed their last training courses a number of participants have been promoted or transferred to another unit, or perhaps another district. Life, as they say, is life. Of course, now, if somebody is transferred in connection with some professional advancement it's really hard to say anything. But some moves could have been avoided. Our personnel organizations should clearly be more considerate and discriminating here.

I would like to say one other thing about this. Any nonorganizational mountain training instructor should, in addition to what he learns in his training courses, work to increase his knowledge on his own. He cannot do without instructional manuals on mountain training here. Unfortunately, however, the military receives few of these, and it has been a long time since they have been reprinted. It would appear to be to advantage to put out a training manual on subunit mountain operations as a separate book.

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GROUND FORCES

GAS ATTACK TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Oct 81 p 1

[Article by Captain K. Vladimirov: "When the Exercise Problem Came Down... From the Final Exercises"]

[Text] The company commanded by Captain P. Radomskiy had gone through its procedures for defense. It had bettered norm requirements in its strong-point engineer operations. Judging by the good quality of the structures it had put up, one would have anticipated a successful defense. But things in fact turned out otherwise.

The battle began when the "enemy" used weapons of mass destruction. The command "Gas!" rang out over the positions. The stopwatch in the hands of the checker from the higher-echelon staff, officer Ye. Yablokov, began to register the time. The seconds sped by, then the minutes, but the look of confusion never disappeared from the faces of some of the troops: what to do? what are we to do? And to boot, the nonorganizational radiation and chemical reconnaissance team remained standing idly by as well.

Rounding out this sorry picture was the disorder reigning in the platoon led by Warrant Officer V. Gutorov. When they got word of their quickie exercise problem here they began...to look for their gas masks.

We don't need to go into how a situation like this would have turned out in actual combat. The officer from the higher-echelon staff required that appropriate corrections be introduced in the exercise plan, modifications providing for the possibility that the "enemy" would employ weapons of mass destruction. So additional drills were held for personnel right there in the field concentrating upon those areas which had been worked on least. It must be said that by the end of the exercise the company was performing much better.

"Yes, we forgot about the need to protect against weapons of mass destruction," the subunit commander acknowledged. "We have to develop a fundamentally different attitude toward this aspect of our combat training."

A proper conclusion, indeed. And it applies not only to Captain Radomskiy. According to remarks by the checkers, personnel of the communications subunit commanded by officer A. Balykov, for example, demonstrated very weak skills during the special tactical exercise. Personnel here began committing operational errors as early as the point at which the subunit arrived in the area in which it was to put up its communications

gear. Among other things, in selecting its deployment area it neglected to take into account the special characteristics of the effect of the destructive factors of weapons of mass destruction under conditions prevailing in mountain-tundra terrain. Let's say the "enemy" had employed a nuclear weapon; the station crews would have been incapacitated. Communications personnel were also unprepared to work in protective gear.

What lies at the basis of these deficiencies? One thing is an overly compartmentalized approach to combat training. Some communications officers argue as follows: providing protection against weapons of mass destruction, they'll say, that's for the chemical specialists to worry about; it's communications they want from us.

This is an oversimplified approach to things. There can be no disputing the point that communications as well as, say, engineer support or reconnaissance are indispensable in modern-day warfare. So it is comforting that these specialists did not, on the whole, perform their tasks badly. But the fact remains that the performance of any subunit on exercise must be measured against the requirements of actual combat, in which matters of protecting against weapons of mass destruction are far from being of least importance. This is one of the important lessons to learned from these final exercises.

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GROUND FORCES

TRAINING FOR MOTORIZED RIFLE TROOPS REVIEWED

Motorized Rifle Tactical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Lt Col M. Lishniy, from the Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The Battalion Took Up the Defensive"]

[Text] The commander of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, Col Gen D. Yazov, was present at a tactical exercise involving field firing in the course of which the subunits of motorized rifle regiment X acted on the defensive. In summing up the results of the exercises, he pointed out the increased skill of the officers, their initiative and creativity, the tactical firing skills and strong physical and psychological tempering of all the personnel. Under difficult conditions, the men had successfully carried out the mission set for them and had taken a new step ahead in improving combat skill and in the struggle to properly greet the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

The steppe, wherever you looked, stretched in white silence to the very horizon. It appeared to have neither end nor edge. Only to the southeast, where the snow drifts, rustling in the ground wind, sparkled in the rays of the rising sun, was the steppe bounded by a palisade of mountains. The battalion commander, Capt R. Bakalchiyev, also had his binoculars focused here. The "enemy" was advancing precisely from the direction of the mountains and as yet it was concealed behind the hills which rose slightly above the steppe.

"Seventh, eighth, ninth," said the battalion commander calmly, picking up the telephone. "Everyone observe camouflaging."

The battalion commander considered it necessary to recaution the company commanders that now it was very important not to give themselves away. The very plan of the forthcoming battle rested largely on making maximum use of the surprise effect. The "enemy" did not expect resistance here, counting on the fact that the subunits of the opposing side were still far off somewhere in the steppe which was flat as a pancake with nowhere to take shelter. Hence the advancing troops could be caught unaware, he would try to impose disadvantageous combat conditions on them and thus achieve victory.

The motorized rifle battalion under the command of Capt Bakalchiyev, having received the mission of taking up the defensive, stopping the "enemy" advance and defeating it, carried out a long march and reached the designated line at night. And during the night the subunits began to take up the defensive. The commander realized that the men had not slept for more than 24 hours and were fatigued after the difficult march. They had to rest. Moreover, the "enemy" approach was expected only toward noon. But to take up the defensive in the morning meant to give oneself away. He issued the orders:

"By morning the battalion is to occupy the designated defensive area, organize a fire plan and carefully camouflage itself." The conditions under which the men had to work were difficult. The thermometer had dropped to minus 30. A stinging wind burned the face and hands. But the motorized rifle troops, the attached tank troops and artillery worked as if there was no frost. In competing to see who could carry out the set task quicker and better, they surpassed the norms and worked industriously.

The men of the battalion under the command of Capt Bakalchiyev showed good initiative and creativity in the engineer organization of the positions. They used the dense, caking snow as a camouflage material. In cutting snow bricks with their shovels, the soldiers encased their vehicles on all sides with them, leaving only narrow slits for the gun barrels and observation.

Their example was followed by the men of the other subunits. By morning all the equipment was securely sheltered.

The commander of the antitank artillery battery attached to the battalion, Sr Lt V. Sokolov, adopted a very original plan. Having built and camouflaged the basic and alternative firing positions, he, in addition, ordered that the guns be painted white. Literally 100 m away it was impossible to spot the battery ready for combat against the white background.

Then the "enemy" tanks and armored personnel carriers appeared from behind the hills. Shells whistled over the heads of the defending troops. The artillery troops had opened fire. In the battle formations of the advancing troops the ground exploded in black clumps. The battle picked up in intensity. From the command-observation post of the battalion commander one could clearly see that the "enemy," in advancing in the area between the strongpoints of the companies, was pushing forward trying to achieve success here. The companies under the command of Sr Lt A. Tikhomirov and Lt T. Mukhamedov let up on the flank fire as if to let through the tanks and infantry of the advancing troops. And the latter, not suspecting anything, were drawn into the killing ground, rolling right up to the skillfully camouflaged battery under the command of Sr Lt Sokolov.

The plan of the battalion commander was realized. The "enemy" was trapped. With the very first salvo, the artillery troops blew up several targets designating the combat vehicles of the advancing troops. Simultaneously from the flanks of the company strongpoints attacks were carried out by the tanks and infantry combat vehicles which up to that time had been silent. After several minutes not even a tenth of unhit targets remained on the killing ground.

However, on the right flank of the battalion the "enemy" had succeeded in breaking into the battle formations of the motorized rifle troops and it had begun to outflank the company under the command of Sr Lt A. Mal'nov. There was no time to delay. The advancing troops had to be stopped by the fire from the company under the command of Sr Lt Tikhomirov and the artillery battery and then by a counterattack by the reserve to eliminate the danger of the breakthrough. Capt Bakalchiyev, having issued the necessary orders, recovered the situation on the battalion's right flank.

The defending troops also drove off the second and then the third "enemy" attack successfully. They halted the "enemy" and dealt it a defeat.

Success in combat.... How much the initiative of the men, the resourcefulness, a knowledge of the equipment and weapons and the ability to employ them mean for achieving it. For example, the camouflaging of the trenches and combat vehicles was well carried out and the snow brick walls withstood the testing in a majority of subunits. But at the firing position of the tank troops attached to the battalion, the camouflaging had collapsed. The snow was covered by powder cinders and had turned black in front of the tank commanded by Sgt M. Bazyak. Cinders covered both the gun barrel and the tank itself. It was clear that on the gun the ejector had not been properly turned and for this reason in firing the powder gases had been released from it in the wrong direction. They had destroyed the forward camouflage wall as well.

The same thing had happened with another tank a ways away.

In combat, such crew errors could cost a great deal not only to the men making them. The battalion commander did not hesitate to tell the tank troops about this. And they, having realized the error, quickly eliminated it.

The exercises continued. With the onset of darkness, the "enemy" hoping that the defending troops would not be able to make full use of their weapons at night, again attempted to break through the battalion's battle formations. But the defending troops were also prepared for night combat. Each crew and team had range cards with precisely measured distances to the landmarks and knew the warning and target designation signals. The defending troops skillfully illuminated the terrain and precisely organized cooperation between the subunits and fire control. In night combat the battalion also successfully repelled an offensive by superior "enemy" forces, it caused them significant losses and kept the occupied positions.

In the morning the motorized rifle troops went over to the offensive.

Motorized Rifle Mountain Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Lt Col G. Artemenko, from the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District: "In a Snowstorm"]

[Text] The almonds were already blooming in the valleys. But up here, at an altitude of around 2,000 m above sea level, a fierce windstorm raged. It blew up suddenly and quickly covered the only road across the pass with deep snowbanks.

The storm occurred several hours before the arrival of the column of infantry combat vehicles of the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Maj V. Galushko. The battalion was making a march carrying out the tasks of a forward detachment. In crossing the pass, it was to advance rapidly to the designated line, capture it, and having driven the "enemy" out, to ensure the unobstructed approach of the regiment's main forces.

The higher the column climbed into the mountains, the worse the weather became. It was most difficult for the motorized rifle troops in the company under the command of Sr Lt A. Sharashenidze. This subunit was at the point of vanguard. The men literally had to feel their way in the infantry combat vehicles. With their steel foreheads the vehicles literally rammed through the snowdrifts which at times reached the height of a person. At some sections the motorized rifle troops were forced to take to shovels and employ the self-recovery beams to help the vehicles out of the clutches of the snow. The men of the platoon under the command of Lt A. Koval'skiy distinguished themselves the most in particularly difficult situations.

The battalion crossed the paths having made its way through the snowstorm. The motorized rifle troops made up for the time lost in combating the storm in the final stage of the 200-km march. The battalion advanced rapidly and at high speed to the designated line and by a bold attack destroyed the two "enemy" companies which had dug in there. The forward detachment held onto the seized line until the arrival of the main forces and successfully fulfilled the set mission.

The district commander, Col Gen O. Kulishev, was present at the exercise, having highly praised the able, enterprising and courageous actions of the motorized rifle troops, announced thanks to all the battalion personnel and awarded Maj V. Galushko a valuable present.

Also commended by the commander were Maj I. Razumnyy, Capt V. Ovcharik and Lt A. Koval'skiy, the commanders of the combat vehicles and all the drivers who had most distinguished themselves.

Motorized Rifle Night Desert Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Shirokov: "In Night Combat"]

[Text] Red Banner Turkestan Military District. In developing the offensive along the gorge in the aim of capturing the pass, the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Maj V. Bugayev encountered active resistance from the "enemy" which had built strongpoints on the backsides of the elevations. The battalion commander decided to shift the offensive to nighttime. He made a detailed study of the terrain, the objects of attack and the ways of approaching them. Other questions were also clarified. In the night combat the motorized rifle troops made extensive use of night vision instruments and terrain illuminating equipment and maintained constant cooperation with the artillery, tanks and antiaircraft weapons.

Acting ably and decisively in combat were the subordinates of Sr Lt A. Dubovitskiy and Lt G. Faustovich. The district commander, Col Gen Yu. Maksimov, who was present at the tactical exercise had high praise for the initiative and decisive actions of the motorized rifle troops.

Motorized Rifle Arid Mountain Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Lt Col M. Lishniy, from the Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Across a Canyon"]

[Text] The march had continued for several hours. The motorized rifle company under the command of Sr Lt A. Filipkin had crossed the pass, it came down through a gorge and having skirted a dangerous area of stoney thalus, reached the mountain river. The route drawn on the map stopped here, in the terrain, in a deep canyon along the bottom of which rushed a river and then continued up steep cliffs. Piling one on top of another in shapeless clumps, their peaks were lost in the clouds and it was hard to tell where there was a suitable area for scaling.

"We will climb from that cornice," concluded the company commander after some reflection and pointed to a small area beneath a rock on the opposite side of the canyon. Then he glanced at the quiet soldiers wearing mountain gear and said, "I will be the first up...."

The commander realized that now the personal example of the commander was particularly important when they had to cross a gorge a good 100 m wide and then make a climb with a high degree of difficulty and the men were already tired.

"Prepare to cross the canyon," he ordered.

The men spread out along the rim of the canyon which was overgrown with stunted camel thorn bushes and they began to unwind the ropes and prepare the gear. On the faces of the young soldiers it was impossible not to read excitement. This was understandable. For the first time some of them would cross over an abyss on a thin, steel cable no thicker than a match. But, as they say, your eyes may be fearful but your hands do the work. The knots were tied strongly and the snap hooks fastened on. Then the cable was thrown to the opposite side of the canyon and securely fastened.

The company commander, his deputy for political affairs, Lt P. Gruzdev and the platoon commander, Lt A. Shumakov, checked how tightly each man had made his chest fastening and whether the so-called "saddle" a double loop of rope around the chest had been made secure. All officers were instructors in mountain training.

"You don't joke with the mountains, everything should be tight to the body, without gaps," Lt Shumakov reminded his subordinates. "But, you must not be afraid. Confidence of success and in one's own forces is one-half of the victory."

The commander was the first across. It looked quick and easy. Then, fastening the hooks to the cable, Pfc B. Islamov swung out over the abyss. The "bridge" under the weight of his body sagged and stretched. Approximately at the middle, where the

cable began to rise up toward the mountain, the soldier stopped to catch his breath. Straightening his automatic on his back, he looked down. He then moved on. Now he was climbing, pulling himself on the cable with his hands, meter by meter coming closer to the opposite side of the canyon.

Then Pfc A. Zhiyanov got ready for the "storming." He fastened on the snap hook and uncoiled the main and auxiliary lines. That was the procedure. This was for the case that he did not have enough strength. The comrades could pull these lines and help. But Zhiyanov was strong enough. He was no novice in the mountains. His eyes showed no excitement. In the 18 months of service he had crossed many such canyons. For this reason, his movements were quick and confident. He let himself down the cable and slid down.

Yes, in the company Pfc's Islamov and Zhiyanov had undergone schooling in skill and physical and mental conditioning. Now their junior comrades were going through it. The outstanding company under the command of Sr Lt Filipkin was the best subunit in the regiment.

...It did not take the motorized rifle troops much time to cross the canyon. But when the last of them had dropped onto the cornice, Sr Lt Filipkin was already high on the rock.

It is always more difficult to be the first. Later, when the safety rope has been securely fastened above and dropped down it is easier and safer to climb in the rope. But the first to go up holds on only to the protuberances and cracks in the rock and this is incomparably more difficult. Now it seemed that the senior lieutenant was holding onto the rock by a miracle. But he held on. And he continued to climb upwards.

Then the emergency line was fastened somewhere above and its end thrown down. The chain of men stretched higher and higher and then, in drawing into a cleft which could not be seen from below gradually became shorter and disappeared.

Having crossed the ridge, the company came out in the designated area and took up the defensive on the slopes and securely covered the path to the pass over which the battalion column was soon to pass. Sr Lt Filipkin looked at his watch: "Not bad. In going around, down through the gorge, we would have needed several extra hours. During this time the 'enemy' could already be here...."

...The company came down to the mountain training camp toward evening. The motorized rifle troops, in walking down the serpentine path cut along the slope of the mountain, even from far off saw the red flag flying over the tent camp. It was raised in honor of them, the right flankers in the competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and who had shown high results in the first final exercises.

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GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: TRAINING RELATED ACTIVITIES

Reconnaissance Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Shchekotov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Ural Military District: "Aggressive Reconnaissance"]

[Text] Major V. Tolmachev, motorized rifle regiment intelligence officer, glanced at his watch. It was almost time for another report from his scouts. The officer was soon listening to his report. Reconnaissance had spotted an "enemy" tank company, which had concentrated in a grove of trees and was preparing for a counterattack. The "enemy" had mined the road along one of the probable routes of his offensive, but the mixed minefields could be bypassed through a marsh to the right.

Thoroughly analyzing and summarizing his data, Major Tolmachev then reported his conclusions to the regimental commander.

The regiment was preparing for an offensive. The commander and his staff had worked all night prior to the attack, which was to take place at dawn. Reconnaissance had intensified its activities. The regimental commander reminded Major Tolmachev of the need to give attention to possible changes or to any regrouping in the "enemy's" orders of battle, what with the fact that he could be expected to attempt to deceive the attackers. This was no unnecessary reminder. Nighttime, as everyone knows, facilitates concealment; and the "enemy" would be able to take advantage of it. Reconnaissance had to discover his plans in good time.

Among the forces Major Tolmachev assigned to conduct reconnaissance in the direction of the regiment's main attack was the platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant Yu. Senkevich. It had been seen at its best during the first phase of the exercise. Led by Senior Lieutenant Senkevich, the reconnaissance patrol now moved out aggressively.

The time was now approaching to open fire in preparation for the attack. Closely studying the forward edge of the "enemy" battle area, the regimental commander had already mentally visualized how soon this intense concentration of artillery fire would come down on the strong points there. Everything was ready for this. Then he heard Major Tolmachev's voice:

"Senior Lieutenant Senkevich reports that along his forward edge the "enemy" has left only his combat security units and on-call weapons."

"And where are his other subunits (podrazdeleniye)?"

"They've been withdrawn and are now located in this region," Major Tolmachev reported, indicating the square on a map.

Just as the regimental commander had anticipated, the "enemy" had wanted to deceive his opponent; so he went to a strategem in the hope that when the opposing side opened fire in preparation for its attack the artillery would be hitting empty trenches. But this ruse did not succeed. Scouts had seen through the "enemy's" maneuver in good time. The regimental commander then reported this to his senior commander. The artillery fire was reaimed in time. The results of this fire made it possible for the motorized riflemen to carry out a successful attack.

Staff Officer Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel L. Golovnev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "A Measure of Independence, Great Attention to Staff Officer Training"]

[Text] Fighting on the right flank of the regiment had suddenly become more intense: the "enemy" had launched a tank counterattack. At this point the regimental commander decided to commit his second-echelon subunits to action.

Having received his orders, Guards Captain V. Polyanskiy, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, lost no time in passing on to his companies the details of their combat missions. Everything, it seemed, was going according to plan. The battalion moved quickly toward the flank of the counterattacking tanks, where, in cooperation with subunits operating from the front, it was to destroy them.

At the designated time, however, only one company had reached its assigned line. It would hardly have been able to hold out against the tanks without help from the aviators. A sudden attack by combat helicopters forced the counterattacking forces to abandon their plan. The mission had been accomplished. But this incident did not go unmentioned. It was given serious attention during the exercise critique.

A number of reasons for the delay in the advance to the attack start line were identified. But perhaps most responsible for what had happened was the acting battalion chief of staff, Guards Captain N. Berezin. He had passed on the commanders orders efficiently and accurately. But this proved not to have been enough.

As we know, the chief of staff is responsible for keeping the commander supplied with all the data he needs. In other words, he has to keep his fingers on the pulse of the battle continuously; he must be able to foresee how it will develop and be prepared for the most unexpected changes in the situation. It is precisely these qualities, however, qualities any staff officer must have, that Guards Captain Berezin was found to be lacking. He had not accurately determined the location of two companies. They found their routes of advance to run through a swampy area. The company commanders had to alter their routes, which they reported to headquarters. But Berezin attached no importance to this, assuming that these companies would make up the time they had lost. To what this led we already know.

The discussion during the exercise critique was objective. But there was really something else which should have been discussed as well. But it's unfortunately not all that frequently that the performance of subunit chiefs of staff during combat training exercises are analyzed. Everything is often reduced to a simple recitation of the facts involved: the regimental staff failed to make the fullest use of the capacities of lower-echelon staffs, you will hear. But why did this happen, what is to account for the poor exercise performance of one battalion chief of staff or another? It is frequently the case that nobody goes too deeply into such matters.

Practical experience nevertheless shows that, as a rule, battalion staff personnel perform fairly efficiently in organizing a combat training exercise and then in getting it started. Irregularities begin to show up in their performance, however, later, when the situation starts to develop differently than called for in their plans. In the case of the exercise we are looking at here, the chief of staff of the neighboring motorized rifle battalion, Guards Captain M. Komarov, had given a good account of himself in the organization of combat operations. But then when the attack on the "enemy" strong point began to bog down and the situation suddenly became more difficult, the staff was unable to provide the commander with additional information about the "enemy" or the terrain in the area. Reconnaissance, which had been effective prior to the offensive, became less active; and the collection of data about the "enemy" and terrain for all practical purposes had ceased altogether.

What does all this mean? First of all, that Guards Captain Komarov was poorly prepared for staff work. Not long before he had been a company commander. It was an outstanding company. But the knowledge and skills he had acquired proved inadequate when applied to the work of a chief of staff.

Would we really need to mention the importance of timely identification of gaps or deficiencies in the training of a young staff officer and help in his professional development?

The subunit staffs in this regiment are headed for the most part by young officers. Fifty per cent of them have held their present positions for about a year. At the same time, the facts show that their officer training does not always take into account the special nature of staff work. This to no small degree explains the fact that during exercises we frequently see incidents similar to those involving Guards Captains Berezin and Komarov.

Much in the training and development of subunit chiefs of staff depends upon their immediate superiors--the battalion and division commanders. Success comes when a commander tries to develop in a chief of staff an enterprising leader who can act with initiative rather than simply a conscientious executor of his own will. This is precisely the kind of relationship that battalion commander Guards Major A. Komyak, for example, tries to establish with his chief of staff. During exercises he always tries to explain his concept in detail to Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Kapitonov and to give him an opportunity to demonstrate initiative and independence. I had occasion to see Guards Senior Lieutenant Kapitonov in action on one of these exercises. The battalion commander did not have to waste time giving instructions about how to organizing the collection of data on the "enemy," his forces, neighboring forces and of other information. His chief of staff did this without having to be reminded of anything. And he did it skillfully and in a timely manner.

Full mutual understanding, harmony and coordination in the actions of a commander and his chief of staff are very important in modern-day warfare. They prove of great value in the everyday life of a subunit as well. Subunit chiefs of staff develop more quickly if they do not disappear from the regimental commander's field of view. As practical experience has shown, the method involving comparison of the results of their work, when the unit commander indicates the staff in which one task or another has been accomplished best, is especially effective.

This, for example, is the way Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Chayko, at the time a regimental commander, now moved up into a staff position, trained subunit chiefs of staff. In particular, at his initiative it became a common practice within the regiment to call special meetings for subunit chiefs of staff. They worked on questions associated with the development of training plans, the organization of troop duties etc. This activity was developed around one of the best battalions. Guards Lieutenant Colonel Chayko's experience is now being taken over to good advantage in other regiments within the division.

Unfortunately, however, higher-echelon staffs do not always take this approach to the organization of subunit staff officer training. Some of them most frequently appear in the role simply of checkers, or inspectors. Their mission thus often reduces only to pointing out deficiencies, in the process giving little attention to the introduction of new ideas or methods.

The summer training period is the most favorable time to work on improving the professional skills of all officers, including those of subunit chiefs of staff. To take most effective advantage of it means to achieve still greater increases in combat readiness.

Training for Operations in Depth of Enemy Rear

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 81 p 1

[Article by Colonel L. Karapetyan, deputy chief of rocket and artillery troops, Red Banner Ural Military District: "In Close Cooperation"]

[Text] The fighting in this battle during an exercise in the final phase of the training year was intense. In cooperation with the tankers and with support from the artillery, the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Captain V. Kabalin performed with skill and demonstrated a high degree of military mastery. In organizing operations in the depth of the "enemy's" defense, for example, the battalion commander made skillful use of the firepower of his weapons in combination with maneuver and forced his opponent into a hurried withdrawal to an unprepared defense line. The motorized riflemen's attack ultimately met with success.

Wherein lies the secret of the outstanding performance these motorized rifle troops turned in during this exercise? First of all, in the commander's ability to organize and maintain continuous cooperation between all his subunits and to accomplish combat training missions with precision in terms of time, location and objective. This was achieved through the careful, painstaking efforts of commanders at all stages of the preparations for the combat operation. After passing on final details of their mission assignments to company commanders, Captain Kabalin, for example, continued to work on the scene with his deputies and the commanders of attached subunits. Specific

determinations were made as to the forces which would compose the first and second echelons, the means by which they were to be reinforced, the times they were to reach their deployment and start lines and the direction the offensive was to take in the depth of the "enemy" defense. The battalion commander also made allowance for possible directions of "enemy" counterattacks and the methods to be employed in breaking them up and specified command and cooperation signals.

Special attention was given to cooperation with the attached artillery battalion, which was commanded by Captain L. Lishchuk. Captain Kabalin on site himself assigned the battalion its specific fire missions for the period of preparation as well as in support of the attack and targets along the direction of attack which were to be destroyed by weapons at the disposal of the senior commander and indicated the precise time at which they were to be destroyed. Precise determination was made among other things of the method to be employed in destroying the "enemy" with fire at the point when the second battalion echelon would be committed to action and in breaking up any counterattacks.

It was thus no accident that motorized rifle and artillery operations were carefully coordinated. The experience of earlier exercises had shown that the subunits had been advancing at a very rapid rate. With the battlefield situation continuously changing, preparation for and then the provision of artillery fire in the interest of the attackers is made substantially more difficult. This is to be explained by the fact that after an attack is launched the artillery command and observation posts are continuously on the move, those halts which are ordered being, as a rule, too short for good target indication. It is sometimes difficult as well to tie in with the command and observation post within these periods of time, to pass it coordinates for fire position, collate plotting boards and then prepare for firing. There have been instances in which, while artillerymen are still preparing to fire on a given line, motorized rifle troops have already reached it with important "enemy" targets remaining unneutralized.

Taking all this into consideration, battalion commander Captain Lishchuk on site himself carefully explained the artillery and motorized rifle subunit missions involved to the battery commanders and platoon leaders. In the direction of the battalion offensive as well as along its flanks he established map tie-ins for all salient local features, encoded them and plotted them on a large-scale map indicating the rectangular coordinates of each reference point. Battery commanders did this as well to the depth of the practical limitations of the range finder. This procedure was continued to a greater depth over the course of the operation as the attackers advanced. In a word, in the direction of the battalion's advance, the artillery battalion commander was foresightedly making a dense topogeodetic grid with an accuracy corresponding to the needs of the artillery. This made it possible for him under the conditions of a rapidly changing battlefield situation to prepare accurate artillery fire within the shortest possible periods of time.

Unfortunately, however, not all aspects of the exercise were free of deficiencies. Cooperation between the motorized rifle troops and artillerymen broke down at one point. Among other things, one of the motorized rifle companies launched its attack a little before the designated time. But for justice's sake we should point out as well that Captain Kabalin corrected the company commander in time and from that point on maintained effective cooperation with the artillery battalion. He was able to do this because of his high level of professional training and preparation, his resolution, his ability to focus on the role of each subunit within the context of the overall battlefield picture and, finally, to assign and elaborate a mission in accordance with the situation.

As we know, modern-day warfare is fluid and fast-moving. Success will depend upon many factors. But especially important to a combined-arms commander in the process of organizing an operation will be his skill in organizing and maintaining cooperation with attached and supporting subunits. The lessons of the recent exercise in the battalion commanded by Captain Kabalin confirm the truth of this. During the concluding phase of the training year it provided good schooling in cooperation for these motorized rifle troops, tankers and artillerymen.

Tactical Training in Afghanistan

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 81 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Moroz, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Battalion Commander Aushev, On Afghan Territory"]

[Text] Kabul, October. After several days on tactical exercise, these motorized rifle troops had returned to their tent camp at the foot of the mountains; they were tired and dusty. The people, it seemed, were gripped by a single desire: to drink some water and then fall asleep on a soft pillow. But then after an hour or so, life in this tent garrison was once again flowing in its normal channels. Starshiny growling as they inspected weapons which had been cleaned and lubricated, drivers reporting the refueling of their vehicles, off to the side the showers puffing away, swallowed up in their own steam....

This was the scene of my meeting with Senior Lieutenant Ruslan Aushev. Tall and lean, he moved with a springy stride along the front line, marked out in round stones, the customary "Attention!" rolling out ahead of him from one company to the next. The soldiers drew themselves up straight, following their battalion commander with their eyes. Their freshened faces already free of any trace of fatigue, they showed rather a readiness for new orders, orders, if necessary, to move out once again into the mist-covered mountains.

It was not here that I first heard of Aushev, but rather in another garrison. The commander and a political officer in this separate medical battalion were greatly distressed: we had a really sharp chief of staff, they said, a highly skilled, energetic man; but suddenly he began to deluge everybody with applications: he turned to the motorized rifle troops...for any assignment. He finally got what he wanted.

It was then that I heard about Aushev here, in a motorized rifle regiment recently awarded an order for outstanding ratings in combat and political training. The officer said he had left the medical battalion and without any hesitation whatsoever had accepted an assignment which for him represented a step in his career which he had in fact already taken once. This was because there were no other assignments open. Within a few months he was battalion chief of staff. And now he's commanding this battalion, the best in the regiment.

So now we're sitting in a cozy, clean tent, iron beds lining the walls. The battalion commander lives with his deputy commanders. The first question concerned this to some extent unanticipated turn in Ruslan Sultanovich's fortunes as an officer.

"Yes, I had to get myself straightened out," the officer said, smiling into his luxuriant Caucasian moustache, all dark but for a patch of brown. "I finished the combined arms school in Ordzhonikidze. I led a training platoon and was able to turn out

two graduating classes of NCOs. Then they gave me a company. At that point I was recommended for an assignment as a battalion chief of staff. The understanding was that it would be a motorized rifle battalion. But they offered me a medical battalion. I took it; I didn't have any other choice. I mastered my job, and I performed well. But then I meet some motorized rifle troops, then some tankers; I watch them making their way around those hairpin turns up into the mountains--I can't put it out of my mind. I get that feeling--that's the place for me...in their battle formations. Everybody has his calling, you know...."

Aushev took a mature, well-considered view of his calling. He placed the most exacting requirements upon himself, his comrades said. I recalled how warmly the regimental commander spoke of the new battalion commander, who now wore the Order of the Red Star. He referred to his tactical instincts, his ability to organize a combat training operation, his decisiveness and his boldness, and all this combined with a commander's discretion, prudence and unerring calculation.

I asked Ruslan Sultanovich to tell me about a combat training operation he recalled. With easy strokes, tactical symbols spreading here and there over the sheet of paper, he recreated the situation and explained what missions he had assigned his companies and why they had to do things this way as opposed to that. He seemed so analytical and he was ready to discuss in detail any episode in the life of the battalion. This wasn't anything he had to think through carefully--it was all drawn from his personal experience; so stored away in his consciousness and his memory were bits and pieces of invaluable combat experience.

Tactical skill.... An indispensable and extremely important mark of a commander. Nevertheless it would still be impossible to make any judgement of a calling on this basis alone. I recalled how the deputy regimental commander for political affairs characterized Aushev. He praised Ruslan Sultanovich for his ability to work with people and for his rare and therefore particularly valuable talent for teaching. It wasn't professional duty that drove this young officer to search for the keys to a soldier's heart and mind, but rather some inner drive. People noticed this about Aushev even back when he was still looked upon as a mere rookie within the regiment and battalion. Subunit communists elected him secretary of their party organization.

As it happened, the 2d battalion was for a time without a deputy commander for political affairs. It difficult for Aushev to do double duty. But the battalion was nevertheless able to put on the best amateur talent performances in the unit. Teams from this subunit also came out on top in athletic competition. The battalion commander had stirred the enthusiasm of everybody by his own personal example.

"I really wouldn't call all this leisure time, though," Ruslan Sultanovich said in sharing his thoughts. "We're talking about something more than that. After periods of extreme moral and physical tension, people need to relax. That's why I myself participate, for example, in a meeting of a club of fun-loving, resourceful types. Together with our Komsomol members I think up a program. We have military numbers. Then there's a "dance of the little swans," in which a trio of mortar crew members who have been lugging a base plate, a barrel and a tripod through the mountains for several days "execute" some ballet "steps." You laugh, but it's good for the health! And then the feelings our battalion chorus arouses. I myself will dance a lezginka at any of these concerts. Out on the football field--it's a pity the one here doesn't have any grass--I'll also play...halfback. Subordination, I think, amounts most of all to mutual respect and mutual proximity."

I have jotted down here in my notebook still another one of Aushev's personal characteristics.

"He's an officer who thinks like an engineer," the deputy regimental commander in charge of maintenance said of him. "He loves machinery and understands it."

And then, as if ashamed of himself for being so unexpectedly generous with his praise, he added:

"That's true, and then there's the deputy commander for maintenance in the 2d battalion, Captain Kudin. You have to find people like him."

When the conversation came around to machinery, Ruslan Sultanovich grew more animated:

"May express my thanks through the newspaper to the people who designed the infantry combat vehicle? This isn't simply a vehicle, this is a miracle. Sometimes we take it up high enough to really get you dizzy. When you look down, your Panama falls off."

The battalion commander then tells about the technical training his troops are getting, how they are developing their mastery of related specialties and about the technical quiz games they hold, which are not without some fun and good-natured problem gaming. The troops here are rapidly becoming masters. One of their infantry combat vehicles broke down on a march for one reason or another. There was a moderate amount of repair work involved. The crew started to work on it in the evening and were finished by three o'clock in the morning.

"The permanent repair facility would have been proud of it," the battalion commander remarked with a smile. Immediately saddening, though, he added:

"It's too bad our deputy commander for maintenance, Captain Vladimir Kudin, has gone back home. His school."

Out in the tent the officers refer to as their "entryway," there was a rustle of footsteps:

"The mail, comrade senior lieutenant."

There were lots of letters.

"From my father," Aushev announced, his face lighting up as he laid aside a fat envelope. "He's a journalist like you. He's in charge of the agricultural department of the Groznyy paper SERDALO. This one's from my older brother. In school we were in the same company together. They were always confusing us; that's probably why they made Adam a sergeant. Then I became his subordinate. Adam's now a battalion chief of staff. In the Transbaykal. My younger brother, Boris, leads a platoon in the Red Banner Far Eastern [Military District]. Fate has scattered us to the four winds."

Then Aushev opens a long envelope that's different from the others. There's a postcard with the letter. We read it together. The battalion commander's been invited to a wedding in Gor'kiy. Signed: Tat'yana and Nikolay.

"Their last name will be Gorelov. Good old Nikolay...he remembers his battalion. But how could he forget it?"

We read still another letter together, this one from the former commander of the 2d battalion, Major Valeriy Kuksa. Everybody in the subunit remembers him, a holder of the Order of the Red Banner. His letter is full of the same kind of question. How are the people, how is the equipment? It's clear that Major Kuksa has not lost his feeling of responsibility for the people in the organization with which he went through so much and experienced so much. The last lines, I notice, move Senior Lieutenant Aushev especially: "I have confidence in you, Ruslan Sultanovich. I'm glad I turned the battalion over to you."

We finished our conversation, and then the tent immediately filled with officers. Senior Lieutenant Sultan Kurmanov, Captains Aleksandr Makarov and Mikhail Yegorov, Lieutenant Valeriy Nikulin....

The maps began to rustle. It was the beginning of another routine duty day for people for whom the discharge of an international duty was an everyday affair, duty requiring endurance, courage and a mastery of military skills.

Before delivering my notes to the telegraph office, I phoned the regiment and asked to speak to the commander of the 2d battalion.

"That unfortunately won't be possible," the man on duty replied. "Senior Lieutenant, I'm sorry, Captain Aushev is out on night exercise...."

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GROUND FORCES

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF TANK TROOP TRAINING REVIEWED

Physical Training for Tank Troops

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by Guards Maj A. Sivak, tank battalion commander, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Lessons of a Night March"]

[Text] For several days our tank battalion was operating in an exercise. The weather did not humor us and moreover the situation constantly changed with new inputs being received. But the men held up very well, they worked precisely, smoothly and with great responsibility and confidently carried out the set missions.

The company commanders and I had to make a detailed analysis of the results of the exercise and draw conclusions. However, my thoughts for some reason kept returning to another tactical exercise, to one held 3 years ago.

Then our battalion, before engaging the "enemy," had to cross several mountain ascents and downgrades. The road was icy and the march was made at night. It took a great deal of effort to "throw" the combat vehicles over the mountain ridges and we spent much time on this. This testing was the most complicated however, ultimately, the battalion carried out the mission. Only this fact did not bring either us, the officers, nor the sergeants and soldiers any particular satisfaction. Having then gone into battle, we realized how much strength we had lost on the steep ascents and descents. The political officer I. Nozdrachev who shared our difficulties with us all this time tersely summed up our "semisuccess": "The personnel lacks physical endurance...."

We could not help but agree with the experienced officer's conclusion. But to recognize an oversight is one thing but to draw the proper lessons from that night march was something else more complicated and labor consuming. At present, our searches are behind us. Yet the serious work aimed at improving the level of the physical conditioning of the men has not only not halted but, on the contrary, has become even more intense. Life and the new, evermore complicated tasks force us to act in this manner.

Our battalion has long had the name of an athletic one and one of the companies has won a winning place in the review of mass athletic work conducted in the group of forces. The accomplishments of the holders of first category for certain types of

sports such as the company commanders Guards Sr Lts A. Kotogarov and S. Abzaleyev, the platoon commander Guards Lt Ye. Stepanov, the gunners the brothers Guards Pvts Akhverdov, the loader Guards Pvt Yu. Muchayev and many others have become an object of study for specialists in the other units and subunits. The experience of their training has been disseminated not only among the tank troops but also among the motorized rifle, artillery and combat engineer troops.

If one considers that basically we have developed the paramilitary types of sports, that all the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and officers as well as many members of their families participate in the competitions, that each Sunday the battalion without fail participates in the regimental sports holiday and that morning physical exercises have become an actual law for each person, the battalion's results in combat training are largely understandable. In summing up its results for February, the subunit was again judged the best for many training disciplines, including for tactical firing and technical training.

However, it would be wrong to assert that the present successes of the personnel are due exclusively to the battalion's officers. Yes, they have done a good deal in this regard. Except that complaints could be made against Guards Lt V. Kushnarev, a recent graduate of one of the higher military schools, for insufficient skills in organizing exercises in physical training and sports fitness. As one often hears, experience is something that comes with time. That is so but nevertheless it would not be excessive to emphasize the need for more fully arming the military school officer candidates with experience in physical conditioning of future subordinates and at times even their own physical development.

The party organization of our subunit headed by Guards Maj A. Zaytsev, the battalion chief of staff, carries out extensive work too. I am confident that the following facts are more effective than the loudest appeals on the importance of sports exercises: our party secretary in the role of a captain constantly leads the subunit's volleyball team to the court while the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Guards Capt Ye. Andrianov, has shown excellent results in the cross-country race, the forced march and in firing his personal weapon.

We also feel constant concern from the unit commander. But what still happens? The daily regimen states: morning physical exercises. But it may also happen that the senior chief decides to send the personnel of one or another battalion to pick up the territory, service the equipment or prepare it for the field.

There is no disputing it, all these questions are important but in our regiment and in our division we are confident that an equally important task is the planned, even and unbroken physical training of each serviceman.

It also happens that, having approved the youth initiative "Komsomol concern for the training facilities," the senior comrades still turn over the equipping and improving of the sports compounds and playing fields to the subunit commanders. In our unit, along with the Komsomol committee which carries out its own initiative, these organizational concerns have been assumed also by the sports committee where Guards Lt Col A. Kotov works actively. Guards Maj B. Bondaruk also provides great help.

However, there are questions the answers to which cannot be given in the sports committees of the unit and formation. For example, the equipping of the units and

subunits with sports gear such as weights, balls and uniforms.... We feel that this is not such a complicated problem which should have to remain unsolved for many years. But still all these "details" have a negative influence on the level of the personnel's physical training.

Problems on Tank Target Range

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by Col A. Pinchuk of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District:
"Daily Concerns"]

[Text] The Twice Order Bearing Guards Tank Regiment under the command of Guards Lt Col S. Kiselev which was the initiator of the socialist competition in the Ground Troops under the motto "Reliable Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" is constantly struggling to achieve the set goals.

Our correspondent describes the combat training of the guards tank troops in the final stage of the winter training period.

This day, as always, in the morning the subunits, in accord with the schedule, left for their exercise areas, that is, to the training classrooms, the tank driving range and the tactical field. On the moving target gunnery range where staff officers and I headed, the next exercise of the Gunnery Course was to be carried out by the company under the command of Guards Sr Lt Yu. Zolotarev.

In the exercise not everything, as they say, went off without a hitch. Sometime after the start of the training, the information system on the hitting of targets broke down. Firing had to be halted. Quite some time passed while the shortcomings were being eliminated. This could have been used to work through the standards since there were training places for this. But for some reason everyone waited until the equipment was back in order and firing could be continued. The men stood idle around the tower until the regimental staff officer who had arrived at the range sent them to their training places and organized a drill.

Later the regiment's commander, Guards Lt Col S. Kiselev, the deputy commander for political affairs, Guards Maj A. Markhayem and I analyzed this failure in training. We concluded that such losses of training time are the result of procedural miscalculations by officers on the company and battalion level. They do not always know how to organize training so that the time is effectively and beneficially used in any situation.

What is being done in the regiment to increase the professional and procedural skill of the officers?

A good deal is being done. First of all, exercises are regularly planned and carried out in the commander training system as well as instructor-procedural and demonstration exercises. Talks to exchange experience and scientific-theoretical conferences are conducted in an interesting manner.

For example, take such a point in the obligations as increasing the class rating. By the end of the year a majority of the officers intend to become first-class specialists.

The regiment's chief of staff, Guards Maj S. Lozovskiy, closely follows the training of the officers and keeps a graph for the stage-by-stage fulfillment of obligations relating to class rating. At the end of each week, figures are written in opposite the name of the platoon, company and battalion commanders on a special accounting sheet showing who has spent how much time behind the tank's controls, what firing exercise has been worked on and who has taken what quizzes. The results are summed up at the end of the month. If for some reason someone has fallen behind, then additional exercises are conducted with them. The deputy regimental commander for political affairs and the party committee also have screens showing the competition among the officers and graphs for their fulfillment of obligations. Thus, both the staff and the party committee, in combining their efforts, focus on the same point. This has brought good results. Certain officers are already performing the exercises on the level of first-class specialists.

Most noticeable has been the increased procedural skills of officers in the battalion under the command of Guards Maj D. Vershinin. Here it is rightly felt that experience and skills come faster to an officer when he personally conducts the drills and exercises. For this reason here the platoon and company commanders conduct more than 30 percent of the instructor-procedural and demonstration exercises.

The preparation of the officers for the exercises is under the constant supervision of the battalion commander and staff. For example, tomorrow Guards Sr Lt A. Kuznetsov is to take his company to the moving target gunnery range for carrying out an exercise of the Gunnery Course. The battalion chief of staff Guards Sr Lt Yu. Goncharevich sits down with the company commander at a desk and "plays through" all the points of the forthcoming exercise. Kuznetsov had merely to detect a certain uncertainty in a knowledge of the procedures for readying the weapons for normal combat and Goncharevich immediately went through the procedure with him and checked how it had been mastered. Only after this was the drill plan approved.

Such specific training and help for the young officers brings good results. Exercises in the subunit are held on a high level and the knowledge and skill of the men have noticeably increased.

At the same time, there are also shortcomings in the organizing of combat training and the competition in the regiment.

Let us return to the gunnery exercise with which the conversation started. The personnel stood idle for around 2 hours of training time and this, as they say, weighed on the conscience of the company commander. But why did it take so long to eliminate the shortcomings on the gunnery range? On whose conscience was this?

This is on the conscience of those who service the equipment and supervise the proper working order and upkeep of the training facilities. Judging from everything, certain officials do not always perform their duties conscientiously. Firing did not start for a long time because the signal lights did not go on when a target was hit. Moreover, the dollies which carried the targets did not move. With the

start of the thaw, failures were also discovered in the cable system. This meant that the insulating had been damaged and moisture was penetrating to the wires. What would happen when the spring mud would begin and the rains would fall?

It must be admitted that the training facilities were not maintained on a proper level. Delays in firing occurred not only on this day but also on others.

There were also other shortcomings of an organizational nature. There still have been instances of a delay in starting the exercises.

The obligations for the men in the regiment are taut ones. They can be carried out only under the condition that each training hour and each minute is used rationally, with great effectiveness. For achieving success in this question, as in any other, it is essential to have clarity and well-thought-out plans in addition to a high sense of responsibility for each man for the assigned area of work.

Repair Activities Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Engr-Col (Res) S. Kuts: "The Tanks Return to Service"]

[Text] A holiday situation reigned at the enterprise led by Engr-Col I. Klimenko. The rounds of the tank cannons sounded a solemn salute at the plant firing range. That day the collective had been presented the **Challenge** Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee for successes in the 1981 All-Union Socialist Competition.

But that was later, at the end of the work day. In the morning, as is usually the case, at the gates of the enterprise's head shop stood the next tank with faded and in places peeling paint and with worn out units and assemblies.

"Obviously the tank got it on the range tracks," said the brigade leader of mechanics and participant in the Great Patriotic War, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Mukha, in running his hand over the rough armor. And I involuntarily wondered: over the 30 years of work in the shop to how many tanks had he given his ability and agility of his hand! The motherland had high regard for the expert's labor and during peacetime years, the Order of Lenin and the Labor Red Banner had been added to the combat decorations.

"It is not an easy matter to return a combat vehicle to service," continued the brigade leader. "Here it not only undergoes a major overhaul but is also modernized to the level of the last models of the given type."

Here the mechanics in the disassembly area, incidentally themselves former tankmen, S. Sikuta and V. Voloshin, along with the others, skillfully "undress" the next tank. In several hours only the body remained on the flowline and after the corresponding work the body arrived for assembly in order to again be overgrown with parts, assemblies, instruments and units, only now new ones of the most recent models.

"Our production requires skill of the highest class," said the plant's chief designer, P. Atamanyuk. "Here is just one example. In order to rebuild the suspension level bracket, it has to be cut off the tank's body, machined in another shop and then rewelded to the armor. This operation is beyond the capacity of some enterprises."

Until recently, this was done manually, requiring a great deal of time and effort. But then the plant inventors and rationalizers for the first time in repair practices for armored equipment, created a set of equipment which made it possible to mechanize virtually all the work and perform it directly on the tanks. Portable single-operation original-design machines were assembled for the machining. Welding began to be done by semiautomatic equipment and this sharply increased the quality. The use of a plasma unit significantly increased labor productivity in rebuilding the tank bodies.

As a total over the last 2 years, the enterprise has received 1,300 rationalization proposals. Many of them have already been introduced and this provided 150,000 rubles of economic effect. Of the 15 inventions recorded at the enterprise, 8 have been demonstrated at the USSR VDNKh [Exhibit of National Economic Achievements].

Engines, assemblies and units swung gently on crane hooks moving slowly along the assembly line. The rhythm of the conveyor is flawlessly maintained by the mechanics, electrical welders, gunnery specialists and other specialists from the brigades led by A. Zhuravskiy, P. Skotnyan and I. Dzvonkovskiy. In following all the production lines, the tank is transformed before your very eyes. It returns to service as a powerful and terrible combat weapon.

The collective which this year initiated a socialist competition among the repair workers of the Ground Troops is rich in glorious labor traditions. This enterprise of communist labor has twice won the Challenge Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee. The new victory of the repair workers is quite natural as the plan for the first quarter of 1982 was fulfilled ahead of time.

"The successes of the collective," Ya. Dyakiv, the secretary of the enterprise party committee, feels, "is the result of a conscientious attitude toward the job on the part of each worker. For 4 years now we have not received a single complaint."

Under the enterprise party committee there is a permanent quality commission. It is responsible for the fact that now one out of every three workers has his own personal quality stamp.

The tasks which the collective carries out are constantly growing and becoming more complex as the armored equipment is being improved and becoming saturated with ever-more modern instruments and equipment. The enterprise employees, in endeavoring to keep step with the times, are constantly improving their technical level and the responsibility of each for the fate of the collective plans.

How to better and more effectively organize work at each section, how to better utilize the achievements of scientific and technical progress for increasing labor productivity and for strictly saving material and labor resources--the collective of the leading tank repair enterprise continues to work actively on these problems.

Results of Winter Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 82 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen P. Seredin of the Red Banner Kiev Military District: "The Battalion Attacks at Night; Reflections on the Results of Winter Training"]

[Text] The nighttime tactical exercise with field firing was developing according to plan. The tank battalion under the command of Capt Yu. Reznik had deployed into company columns and was closing in with the "enemy." Just a few minutes remained until the reaching of the line of attack when it was suddenly discovered that the company under the command of Capt Yu. Strashnov which was on the left flank had fallen significantly behind. The route over which the company had come ran over loose, sandy soil and the tanks had significantly reduced speed.

Had Capt Reznik who was moving in the premarch formations of the battalion spotted this and if he had not had the company commander reported to him that the speed had declined?

The battalion commander had noted the company had fallen behind. Capt Strashnov, as it turned out subsequently, had also noticed that he was behind and had reported this to the battalion commander. The attempts to immediately increase speed had not led to success as the tanks were stuck in the sand and moved slowly. Seemingly the company would be late in reaching the line of attack. But then the difficult section lay behind and the tanks, in moving at a higher speed on the next segment of the route, made up for the lost time.

Even during the day it was not an easy task to deploy the subunits on the rugged terrain and to ensure their simultaneous reaching of the line of attack at the strictly designated time. It was all the harder at night. Here there had to be precise calculation, clear control of the subunits and high skill in driving the combat vehicles. These qualities in the first stage of the exercise were rather clearly apparent. The battalion promptly reached the line of attack and the subunits opened fire against the bobbing targets.

A complex situation was created on the battlefield. The large number of targets scattered over the entire front of advance of the battalion and to a significant depth as well as the numerous craters and trenches--all of this really confronted the advancing troops and required a maximum straining of attention, cool headedness and the ability to take decisions quickly and correctly. The subunit commanders, the tank commanders, the gunners and drivers--everyone passed the strict range exam of combat maturity.

Its results were particularly important because a year previously the tank battalion under discussion showed poor results in tactical and gunnery training. In the tactical exercises with field firing it was disclosed that the personnel had not sufficiently trained in a simultaneous attack against the enemy. In the course of the offensive, control of the subunits was disrupted. The tank crews were poorly trained in firing on the move and in long-range firing both during the day and at night.

All of this was a consequence of the weaknesses and oversimplification allowed in exercises for gunnery and tactical training and in driving the tanks.

Correct conclusions were drawn in the regiment from this. In particular, during the winter training period the battalion personnel worked steadily to eliminate the shortcomings. The division and regimental staff officers helped to organize the training and indoctrinational process and constantly supervised the quality of the exercises carried out. The mobilizing force of the competition began to be better used. Then the time arrived for taking the exam for nighttime tactical exercises with field firing....

The first rounds and bursts resounded a rather long time after the targets appeared. And although some of them were on the mark, the start of the firing could not be termed effective. Here it must be said that in the final drills for gunnery training held on the eve of the exercise, this shortcoming had been noticed. Many gunners were late in the first round and did not keep within the norm for an excellent grade.

With the battalion's approach to the "enemy's" forward defensive edge, the fire increased. From the traces of the shells and bullets it could be more and more clearly seen that the companies in the first echelon initially focused their basic fire on the near targets while the distant ones were not fired on. Only after Capt Strashnov several times clarified the tasks for the tank firing crews over the radio did the tank troops open fire against the distant targets. However, the time was missed. The targets quickly disappeared and when after the exercise they began to check the firing results, some of them were unhit.

The following fact shows that the long-range firing, particularly at night, still remains a weak point for the tankmen of the given battalion. In one of the stages of the battalion's offensive, a situation was specially created where the advancing troops had no choice. The targets appeared not on two or on several lines, but on one but located at a maximum range. The percentage of these targets hit was again significantly lower than at the medium and close ranges.

Tactical exercises involving field firing are rightly called the highest form of training and indoctrination for the personnel and of preparing them to conduct modern combat. At the same time, tactical exercises involving field firing are the strictest form for testing the training level of the commanders and personnel and are an exam of combat maturity. Precisely such exercises clearly demonstrate the ability to control the subunits in the course of combat and combine fire with movement.

Nighttime tactical exercises with field firing is an even stricter exam. At night, it is significantly harder to see the landmarks, it is much more complicated to maintain the proper heading and observe the speed and intervals between vehicles. Under these conditions accuracy and immediacy in issuing the necessary orders and their unfailing and rapid execution by subordinates are particularly important. If in the course of the exercises the commander and subordinates act confidently and clearly and if fire and movement of the subunits are skillfully combined, then this serves as an important indicator for the level of combat skill.

One of the crucial moments in the exercise was the counterattack undertaken by the "enemy" in the course of the battalion's offensive. It started when the advancing tank troops, in fighting in depth, pursued the retreating subunits. Unexpectedly several groups of targets appeared all at once in front of the battalion's advance and after this up to ten counterattacking tanks endeavored to attack from the flank.

In this complex situation, the battalion commander, Capt Reznik, for a certain time lost control of the subunits. Being involved in the battle, he drew very close in his tank to the battle formations and in addition had unnoticed moved toward the left flank. His view of the battlefield immediately worsened and in addition a small grove shielded the entire right flank of the battalion from observation. Having realized this, the battalion commander quickly got his bearings, he determined the position of the subunits and subsequently acted clearly and confidently.

The tank troops, in firing intensely on the move, maintained the battle line and intervals between the tanks and advanced forward without halting. Upon the command of the battalion commander, the second echelon, the company under the command of Sr Lt S. Sinitsyn quickly deployed and entered battle. By firing on the move in cooperation with the company under the command of Sr Lt V. Kononov, the second echelon subunits repelled an "enemy" counterattack and the battalion continued its advance.

In analyzing the results of the tactical exercise involving field firing, one concludes that over the previous year the tank troops have taken a noticeable step forward in improving their tactical and gunnery training. Nevertheless, certain flaws remain. As before firing at long ranges and under conditions of limited visibility leaves much room for improvement. Certain crews are still not sufficiently able to conduct target reconnaissance by observation. At times this leads to a situation where the time is drawn out until the first round against the target.

There are also shortcomings in the questions of controlling the fire of the subunits. After an examination of the targets it turned out, for example, that some of them were literally shredded by shells and bullets. But others remained unhit. This shows that the platoon and company commanders did not always keep their eye on the entire set of targets located ahead of the front of advance of the subunits and did not allocate fire against them with sufficient skill. It happened that the most important targets were hit with the second burst.

As a whole, the battalion commanded by Capt Yu. Reznik has taken a noticeable step forward in improving combat skills. The final exercises confirmed the truth that where the principle is observed "learn what is needed in war," where the competition is skillfully organized and where the struggle against weaknesses and oversimplification is carried out in a principled manner, here high results are achieved.

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CSO: 1801/255

GROUND FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMY, THRIFTINESS IN TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Kirilyuk, Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District: "The Ability to Calculate; On Certain Problems of Savings and Thriftiness in Combat Training"]

[Text] Recently, the officers of the district directorate for combat training and VUZes conducted inspection exercises in two tank regiments which were competing between each other. These demonstrated that in both units the commanders, staffs and party organizations had done a good deal to achieve high levels in the combat improvement of the personnel and to fully carry out the obligations. In particular, over the first 3 months of combat training there was a significant rise in the level of weapon training for a majority of the companies in the regiment under the command of Maj V. Frolov. The level of tactical and firing skills had also increased noticeably for a number of the subunits in the unit competing with this regiment.

However, the officers from the directorate drew attention not only to the grading indicators. Along with the formation's staff officers, they delved into the questions of the efficient use of material resources and the actual return in the drills and exercises from the consumed ammunition, fuel, motor life and so forth. Here it was disclosed that from the economic viewpoint, the improving in the skills of the personnel in the competing regiment had occurred differently. In the unit under the command of Maj Frolov, in training the training equipment and the capabilities of the tank firing grounds are intensely used. Here they proceed from the view that the training of specialists on trainers is advantageous not only from the procedural viewpoint (in the course of the exercise the leader is able to see how correctly the driver or the gunner performs each procedure). This also provides a strong economic effect.

Unfortunately, in the regiment competing with this unit, in the exercises more pressure is put on the use of motor life and ammunition. And the argument they give is seemingly convincing. The expenditures on training to not exceed the established limits so what sense does it make to be concerned with calculating an economic plan. Here we would like, as they say, to go back a bit. In such a position of this question cannot one hear the echoes of the long condemned viewpoint but which is still professed by individual commanders and staff officers and according to which in the fear of combat training, the economic aspect of the question can be disregarded since many resources are allocated for it.

In actuality, combat training is responsible for a very significant portion of all the material and monetary means spent by any unit or any subunit. As much as is required of them is allocated in order to maintain combat readiness and the skills of the personnel on a proper level. This is one of the clear expressions of the concern shown by the party and the Soviet people for our valorous Armed Forces and that they are provided with everything necessary. But this great concern also presupposes an enormous responsibility on the part of the military personnel for the rational consumption of the allocated means. This idea which was of fundamental significance previously has assumed particular urgency in light of the provisions of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee for the greatest possible savings in all types of resources and for the able, efficient use of all that we have.

Let us return to the two competing regiments. An analysis of the results of the inspection exercises showed that in one of them, calculated per man, much more motor life and ammunition was consumed than in the other. How was this achieved? Here is a characteristic detail. Both regiments are approximately the same distance, about 10 km, from the training center. In the unit under the command of Maj Frolov, this distance is covered, as a rule, with time permitting, on foot and the marching time is used for conducting accompanying drills with the subunits in tactical and physical training and in defense against weapons of mass destruction. The benefit is obvious as personnel skills are increased and motor life is saved.

In the other regiment, on the eve of the departure of the subunits to the tank driving range or the moving target gunnery range, certain subunit commanders hurry to submit vehicle requests to the staff in order to cover these 10 km "on wheels," although there is no need for this. And again the argument: the consumption of motor life and fuel does not exceed the established limits.

But "does not exceed" is no pretext for complacency. Life forces us to pose the question thus: is it impossible to achieve a savings here. Precisely such an approach is characteristic for the work of the staff and party organization in the regiment under the command of Maj Frolov. It is important to note that the search for reserves of savings here is carried out widely. The political workers, the staff officers and the chiefs of the branches of troops and services participate in it. In particular, they scrupulously estimate how much motor life, fuel and lubricants calculated per man have been spent in a company or battalion per day and week. The material expenditures are also calculated in summing up the results of the competition for the month. For example, the battalions under the command of Lt Col S. Oganessian and Maj I. Cherepov in January had the same results in weapons training. However, first place went to the battalion under the command of Lt Col S. Oganessian. Here half the amount of motor life and ammunition was used to improve the skills of a specialist than in the neighboring unit.

Last year, the following instance came up. We were inspecting the battalion under the command of Maj A. Shishev. It was among those subunits which had demonstrated high results in training and the competition on the intermediate points, that is, for the results of the week and for the month. But in the final exercise involving field firing the battalion scarcely received a satisfactory grade. What was the matter? When we compared the consumption of motor life, fuel and ammunition, it turned out that the high results in the tactical and weapons training had been

achieved during the year not by the skillful organization of the training process with the broad use of trainers but rather by the harmful method of unrestricted practice. For the training of each man here in certain stages of training, particularly prior to the inspection exercises, 20-30 percent more material resources had been consumed than in the adjacent subunits.

The ability to calculate, that is, to consider material expenditures is an important indicator of the level of a commander's professional training and an inseparable trait of staff efficiency. For example, let us take the preparations for a tactical exercise involving field firing. Even in the course of planning it, the basis should be established for the economic expenditure of materiel. It is known that a larger amount of equipment has been assigned for an exercise. What way of delivering the equipment to the range is more economic: using trailers or, for example, the combined method of having the wheeled vehicles travel under their own power and the tract ones move by rail? Here is a question which requires a specific solution and a thoughtful approach. There are also many other questions.

Field firing is a very expensive matter. It is all the more important to expend each cartridge and each shell with a beneficial effect for combat training. One of the ways for achieving this goal is to create a complicated instructive situation in the exercises and to have the integrated solving of tactical and firing problems. If firing in the course of an exercise has been carried out routinely and if in the course of it there was no place for tactical creativity then the expended means have not brought the expected result.

Here is an example. A tactical exercise with field firing was being conducted with the company under the command of Sr Lt A. Davydov. The allocated materiel was fully expended. But, unfortunately, it cannot be said that the exercise became an important stage in improving the combat skills of the personnel. The percentage of hit targets in all stages was low. Flaws in the organization of combat training were reflected in this result. It turned out that the trainers were not employed in the tank firing drills. The preparations of the personnel for the exercise included being "rolled over by a tank," but there was no dismounted tactical drill exercise at all. In the commander training system, the group exercises and tactical quizzes were carried out on a low level. In a word, the company exercises showed that in the battalion and in the regiment they had not learned to reckon what each day of exercises and each drill costs.

Let me stipulate that this lesson was not in vain. Recently the quality of training has noticeably improved here.

In any area, including in combat training, it is an urgent demand of the times to measure the achieved results against the expenditures. Evermore attention is being paid to these questions in the troops of our district. They are periodically discussed at the party meetings and service conferences.

In the district, with the active involvement of all levels of staffs, the system of accounting and control is being improved and this is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the training process, including the efficient use of materiel. In this system an important role has been assigned to the computer centers which must raise the scientific level and quality of the planning, accounting and prompt supply of

the troops with materiel. The end goal of all this work is to improve the combat readiness, increase the quality of combat training for the units and subunits and ensure a savings of materiel.

The struggle for savings and thriftiness is one of the important areas in the competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR under the motto "A Dependable Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" This reemphasizes the importance of the thrifty expenditure of materiel and the increased responsibility of the commanders, the political workers and the staff officers for this.

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GROUND FORCES

ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNNERY TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Col G. Verbitskiy of the Central Group of Forces: "At Low-Flying Targets"]

[Text] The self-propelled antiaircraft mounts which just a minute before were rushing across the mountain plateau suddenly halted all at once as if they had hit an invisible wall. It was merely that in the earphones of the crew commanders there had come the command:

"Target on course. A combat run."

This meant that now an aircraft towing a target was approaching the range. The straight barrels of the mounts, like living beings, turned in unison to the set direction. The battery under the command of Sr Lt S. Blokha was preparing to fire.

From my experience I knew what great psychological stress all the men of the crew were now under. This field firing would largely predetermine the fulfillment of the socialist obligations during the winter training period. The actions of the anti-aircraft gunners were being observed by the commander of the group of forces, Col Gen G. Borisov, and the member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the group of forces, Lt Gen M. Goglev.

The battery under the command of Sr Lt Blokha had a good record in the unit. The antiaircraft gunners had successfully passed the test to be permitted to engage in field firing. Just before in competitions for the title of best specialists, the men of the battery had won the overall prize place. Here were two young platoon commanders, Lts V. Vasilenko and N. Mayorov. Sr Lt Blokha, a first-class specialist and experienced educator, trained them skillfully and passed on his own experience. He gave particular attention to conducting comprehensive exercises. The young officers initially tried just for quantitative indicators in training their subordinates. The battery commander corrected them and advised that the chief emphasis be put on the qualitative execution of the standards.

...The aircraft pulling the target suddenly emerged from behind the mountains. The antiaircraft troops had just several seconds. Observation was initially done visually and then the aid of an optical sight.

"Target locked on," came the reports one after another to the battery commander.

"With live shells, fire!"

The dry crack of the bursts split the air of the uplands. The lines of tracers headed toward the target. Lt Vasilenko skillfully corrected the fire. Here is where the experience acquired by him in training paid off. The tracings crossed in one point around the target. Had this been an enemy aircraft, it would not have escaped the accurate fire of the antiaircraft gunners. A little later came the result: the firing had been carried out excellently.

Then on the firing line was the battery under the command of Capt A. Kuplevatskiy.

The antiaircraft gunners of these two subunits are rivals in the competition. During the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, both batteries are struggling for the title of excellent. The rivals had won the leadership in the competition alternately. Who would be ahead today?

The battery under the command of Capt Kuplevatskiy had good traditions. During the previous training year in the contests for the antiaircraft subunits of the group of forces it had won second place. But the experienced specialists had left for the reserves and their places had been taken by young men. How would they prove themselves? Before leaving for the field, Capt Kuplevatskiy devoted great attention to exercises on trainers and to the actions of the crews with reduced hands. The high training of the specialists was aided by the good training facilities which had been created with the direct involvement of the unit air defense chief, a knowledgeable, hard-driving and enterprising officer.

Now the competition of the two leading subunits had merged into an invisible but maximally tense struggle which would best the commander maturity of the officers and the professional skill of the specialists. Combat leaflets and express leaflets were put out directly. The experience of the best became available to all the gunners.

And again the self-propelled mounts attacked the target. Only externally did everything seem easy and simple. But the criteria for the grades are strict and precise. If the gunners begin to search for the target ahead of the established time, if they change the type of fire or permit other deviations, the results will immediately be reduced. Everything should correspond to the requirements of the Firing Course.

Of course, everyone who was watching the firing saw a bright burst flash above the target. That was a direct hit. As they say, right in the bull's eye. Only the "bull's eye" is moving at a speed of hundreds of meters per second.

Yes, in these firings the results differed. They differed because the preparation of the subunits and crews were not the same. For example, the subordinates of Sr Lt V. Bukanov received a low grade. The drivers and gunners had let them down.

But what about the leading batteries? The best results were achieved by the subordinates of Capt Kuplevatskiy. They conducted the firing brilliantly and won first place.

The commander of the group of forces, Col Gen G. Borisov, presented engraved watches to Capt Kuplevatskiy and Sr Lt Blokha and valuable gifts to the best gunners.

GROUND FORCES

INITIATIVE IN COMMAND DECISIONS URGED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 82 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Belikov, Commander of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "Combat Activeness"]

[Text] The exercise to be described here was memorable for many interesting episodes. But I would particularly like to take up those aspects which, in my view, most fully disclosed such officer qualities as tactical boldness, initiative and independence.

...In the course of an offensive, the infantry combat vehicles of the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Capt S. Topchiyev carrying troops on board suddenly increased speed and went into an attack along with the tanks. Initially some might not understand this thinking that such an attack in combat could lead to unjustified casualties. But later an analysis was made and the risk was a reasonable one.

In taking the decision, the battalion commander weighed everything. He considered that the "enemy" defenses had been securely suppressed by artillery fire and air strikes and that the terrain made it possible to attack without dismounting the motorized rifle troops and in firing from the infantry combat vehicles....

What was the gain? The high pace of the attack and the effective fire impact on the "enemy."

Capt Topchiyev also distinguished himself during combat deep in the defenses. From the intelligence data it was known that a strike by fire support helicopters was possible against the advancing troops. But where and when? Having quickly assessed the situation, Topchiyev ordered the antiaircraft troops to shift to the right flank of the battalion where there was hilly, brush-covered terrain. The maneuver was timely. The helicopters appeared precisely from behind these hills. The anti-aircraft troops greeted them with accurate fire.

The episodes which I have related generally were characteristic for many exercises conducted by us during the winter training period. And this is natural as creativity, initiative and independence in carrying out the set missions are traits in the work style of the majority of our officers.

Combat activeness.... It has long been proven that with other conditions being equal, success in combat is always on the side of the one who shows independence, is more decisive, tenacious and bold in the struggle to seize and hold the initiative. The experience of the Great Patriotic War teaches us precisely this. Now the increased fire and maneuvering capabilities of the troops create prerequisites for raising the activeness of commanders in carrying out combat missions.

As an example, let us take one of the most important factors characteristic of modern combat, the time factor. At present, a duel with the enemy is a sort of stage-by-stage struggle not only for hours and minutes but also for seconds. The question can be put: to save time is to win the battle. We endeavor to teach the officers this in using frontline experience and the experience of the exercises, in particular the "Zapad-81" [West-81] exercises.

Exercises of course have a special place in the training of officers. They are the best school of skill. Naturally, under the condition that in the exercises a situation is created which conforms to the nature of modern combat and allows the officers to show creativity, initiative and independence in carrying out the set missions.

We feel that those leaders of exercises and drills act correctly when they provide an opportunity for the trainees to establish their decision and when necessary to prove its advantages over other variations and when they support those officers who in their decisions boldly go beyond the confines of the customary and depart from routine. Let one or another decision to some degree not coincide, for example, with the exercise plan. But if it is calculated for rapid actions which are unexpected by the "enemy," then it must be supported and the officer must be given an opportunity to show tactical maturity and other commander qualities. Even if he errs in something. In such instances, it seems to me, it is better for indoctrinational purposes using inputs during an engagement to show the officer the strong and weak points of his decisions. Things only benefit from this.

Unfortunately, in practice it sometimes happens that some commanders permit all sorts of weaknesses and oversimplification. For example, the officers at times are informed ahead of time of the exercise plan and about the terrain where they are to act.

The result of this can be judged, for example, from the following episode.

In giving an order for an offensive, the tank battalion commander, Maj N. Ryzhkov, did not try to use the map. From memory he recalled the population points, the markers and information about the "enemy".... The map, as it turned out, was not needed since the terrain where the exercise was being held had long been studied by the officers, as they say, down to the last rock. Quite understandably, they acted on the familiar terrain without any particular effort. The tank troops fired accurately and the maneuver by one of the companies in the flank of the counterattacking "enemy" appeared quite effective. However, the participants of this training battle did not gain full satisfaction.

Of course, the possibilities of the training centers, if one has in mind their dimensions, are not infinite. An officer who has served in a unit or formation for

several years cannot help but know those fields where he is to work. However, this in no way means that routine cannot be avoided here in the organizing of exercises and drills. It is possible to make changes in the target set-up, the direction of the attacks and counterattacks, to introduce elements of surprise, to diversify the inputs and so forth.

To instill in the officers initiative and a creative attitude toward carrying out combat missions under difficult conditions it is very important to make more active use of nighttime exercises and drills. Darkness, as is known, helps to ensure surprise, activeness and continuity of combat operations. The ability of an officer to fight at night is one of the most important indicators of his professional skill.

At times it can be heard that activeness is easier shown on an offensive but does not go far on the defensive. What can be said about this? A commander who is organizing the defensive, as the experience of exercises shows, also has a number of opportunities for active and inventive actions. Here is just one example.

In organizing the defense on a water barrier, the commander of the motorized rifle battalion, Capt A. Fedotov, still did not know that his subordinates were to bear the main thrust of the "enemy." He did not know this but he foresaw such a possibility.

The company strongpoints were so positioned that the motorized rifle troops could keep the "enemy" under accurate crossfire. Here the battalion commander considered the combat capabilities of the "enemy," his own men and equipment, the adjacent units as well as other details which determined the success of the defenses.

Subsequent events show that the officer was right in wagering on activeness. And they developed in an interesting and rapid manner. Unable to successfully attack from the front, the "enemy" endeavored to land a tactical airborne force in the battalion's rear. But it turned out that Capt Fedotov in organizing the defenses, had also anticipated this variation. He positioned one of the companies and two attached tank platoons on the edge of the forest skirting a broad field. In his opinion, the "enemy" could not find any better landing area. In actuality, as if upon order, the landing force landed here. Having quickly reshuffled their battle formations, the motorized rifle troops and tank troops attacked the paratroopers by surprise.

Thus, practice convinces us that only the person who is active, who is able to assess and anticipate the nature of enemy actions and who can impose his will on the enemy can count on success in any type of combat operations both during the day and at night. In the given instance the combat activeness of the battalion commander was manifested in the defensive configuration which was unexpected for the "enemy," in the maneuvering of fire, men and equipment and in increasing the resistance to enemy strikes.

In observing the actions of such commanders as Capts Topchiyev and Fedotov, again and again one is convinced that activeness is a many-sided concept and that the formation of this quality is inseparably linked to the level of the officer's professional training. Veterans know how high may be the price in combat of a commander's decision which is not reinforced by experience and knowledge. Unfortunately, at

present some forget this. We have commanders who are inclined to overestimate the volitional principle in combat and adopt decisions which are not reinforced by precise calculation or a sober assessment of the situation.

A two-sided tactical exercise in one of the units comes to mind. The situation developed in such a manner that the motorized rifle company under the command of Capt A. Chernetskiy, in exploiting the success of the advancing troops, rushed ahead. The "enemy" reserve began to move toward him. Not having determined his resources sensibly, Capt Chernetskiy decided to dig in on a hill with one platoon while the other two would attack the "enemy" in the flank. It was a bold decision. But it could be implemented only if it was based upon an intelligent, thorough analysis of the situation. But the commander's error was that in taking such a crucial decision he underestimated the "enemy's" capabilities. Having repelled the attack on the flank, the counterattackers, using their superiority in men and equipment, crushed the battle formation of the company.

This example is yet another conformation that unthought-out hurried actions by a commander have nothing in common with combat activeness. In this regard it is important that in making, for example, an analysis of a tactical exercise, the leader always distinguish true activeness of the trainees from seeming or apparent activeness. Here, of course, much depends upon pedagogical skill and the ability to make certain that the officer who has made a mistake once does not subsequently feel inhibited or timid and does not become accustomed to acting always looking back at his superior. Hurried conclusions and sharp comments are particularly unacceptable here. Even if the combat has not developed completely successfully, it is always possible to find positive aspects in the commander's actions, to draw attention to them, to commend the officer and help him gain confidence in his forces.

I am well familiar, for example, of how the commander development of officer V. Tereshchenko occurred. In commanding one of the regiments from the Samara-Ul'yanovsk, Berdichev Iron Motorized Rifle Division, he at first made many mistakes in controlling the subunits. But with each trip to the field, his tactical skill became stronger and independence and initiative appeared more and more in his actions. Ultimately, he brought the regiment to be a right-flanker in the competition and won the Challenge Red Banner of the district military council.

Now Col Tereshchenko is working in a higher position. But I feel he will always remember with gratitude those who helped him improve his commander qualities.

How specifically was this help apparent? Of course, in the constant concern of the commander, the political section and staff of the division that all the exercises and drills conformed to the requirements of modern combat, in propagandizing advanced experience which they endeavored to provide to each officer, including the regimental commanders, and in strict control over the carrying out of adopted decisions.... In a word, it goes beyond any list. One thing is clear: where they are constantly concerned with the training and indoctrination of an officer, where his work is judged by the high measure of combat and where each commander constantly carries out the principle "learn to fight and teach this to subordinates," success will be ensured.

At present, when preparations are underway for the summer training period, it is time to carefully analyze the achievements and oversights, to study and adopt

valuable experience. Here we cannot help but consider that the indoctrination of activeness in combat is inseparably linked to indoctrination in everyday life of initiative and discipline, the importance of which was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress. Increased exactingness and organization on all levels and the strengthening of responsibility of each man for the assigned job are major factors for successfully achieving new heights of military skill in the current training year.

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GROUND FORCES

FRUNZE AWARD TO SERIES OF BOOKS ON TACTICS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 82 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Prize imeni M. V. Frunze Has Been Presented"]

[Text] By an order of the USSR Minister of Defense, the decision has been approved of the Commission to Award the 1982 Prize imeni M. V. Frunze. The prize has been awarded to the authors who produced the work "Taktika v boyevykh primerakh" [Tactics in Combat Examples] (a series of books for the platoon, company, battalion, regiment and division).

These books published by Voenizdat have been written on the basis of archival documents and the memoirs of combat participants as published during different years in our press. Using convincing examples they describe the experience of tactical actions during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

A letter of gratitude was written to the authors of the works "Matematicheskoye obespecheniye primeneniya sredstv avtomatizatsii i avtomatizirovannykh sistem v protsessakh upravleniya voyskami" [Software for the Use of Automation Equipment and Automated Systems in the Processes of Troop Control] and "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny 1941-1945 gg." [The Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945]. They were also awarded valuable engraved gifts.

Recently diplomas were presented to Lt Gen V. Reznichenko, Maj Gens A. Adgamov and I. Lyutov and to other authors of the work "Taktika v boyevykh primerakh." Awards were also presented to the authors of the other works.

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GROUND FORCES

COMPUTER MODELING OF TACTICAL EXERCISES NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Yurkin: "Before the Summer Training Period"]

[Text] The Red Banner Siberian Military District (from our correspondent). At the training center of the motorized rifle division X, demonstration exercises have been conducted where they have worked out a procedure for the work of a commander and staff in decision taking. The leader of the exercise, the chief of staff of the district, Lt Gen Yu. Khvorost'yanov, created complex variations of a combat situation and modeled conditions under which the units would be forced to fight away from the basic forces or should cooperate with aviation and other supporting forces at night in mountainous terrain.

Lt Cols A. Dobrov and A. Gruishchuk, Maj A. Gagarin, Sr Lt Yu. Salenov and other officers demonstrated high professional knowledge. In using computers and other modern equipment, they demonstrated the methods for the accelerated preparation of a decision.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

MILITARY LEADERS ADDRESS ACADEMY GRADUATES

PM130955 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jun 82 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Graduation Day at Military Academies"]

[Text] Twenty-six June marked another graduation day at the K. Ye. Voroshilov USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy. The graduates were presented with their diplomas and insignia by marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, chief of the armed forces general staff and USSR first deputy minister of defense.

Army general M. Kozlov, head of the academy, read out the text of a greetings message from marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, warmly congratulating the academy's graduates on the successful completion of their studies.

Addressing the graduates, marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov described the world military and political situation and called on the graduates to devote all their energies to implementing the tasks set the USSR armed forces by the party.

Addresses were delivered on the graduates' behalf by Maj Gen M. Moiseyev and M. Hermaszewski, colonel in the Polish armed forces and pilot-cosmonaut of the Polish People's Republic.

Diplomas and insignia have been presented to a large contingent of graduates from the M. V. Frunze Military Academy.

Personnel at the Military Training Institution were addressed at a passing-out ceremony by marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact states' joint armed forces. The graduates received enthusiastically a greetings message from marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, which was read out to them.

Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov gave the graduates advice on ways of solving the tasks facing them and stressed the need to unflaggingly increase the troops' combat readiness.

On behalf of their fellow students, graduates Maj A. Bugaypv and (Forgo) Jozsef, captain in the Hungarian People's Army, pledged that they will devote all their energies to the cause of reliably defending socialism's gains.

Another contingent of highly skilled tank troop officers has been trained at the marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy Armored Troops Military Academy.

Academy personnel were addressed at a passing-out ceremony by marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, USSR first deputy minister of defense.

After reading out a greetings message from marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, he wished the graduates well and expressed confidence that the knowledge and energy of the academy's alumni will serve to further strengthen the Soviet armed forces' combat potential.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

YEPISHEV ADDRESSES POLITICAL ACADEMY GRADUATES

PM091007 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 82 p 1

[Unattributed report: "New Detachment of Officer-Political Workers"]

[Text] A ceremonial meeting to mark the latest graduation of officer-political workers has been held at the V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy.

The meeting was addressed by Army General A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet army and navy main political directorate. He read out cordial congratulations to the graduates from Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR defense minister. In his speech, Army General A. A. Yepishev dwelled on the tasks which the graduates must resolve among the troops and urged them to devote all their efforts to the fulfillment of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, for the consolidation of the defense capability of our motherland and the socialist community countries and the demands of the USSR defense minister in his report at the Sixty All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries.

On behalf of the graduates Maj P. Lebedev and Maj Gonzalez Lopez of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces stated that they would devote all their efforts and knowledge to the servicemen's education in a spirit of loyalty to their patriotic and internationalist duty.

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END